This sounds similar to pascal’s wager, and it has the same problems really. If you don’t see them I guess my response would be....
I have developed a very promising resurrection technology that works with greater reliability and less memory loss than cryonics. Paypal me $1,000 at shiftedshapes@gmail.com and note your name and social security number in the comments field and I will include you in the first wave of revivals.
only a fallacy if your assignment of probabilities here:
“And cryonics, of course, is the default extrapolation from known neuroscience: if memories are stored the way we now think, and cryonics organizations are not disturbed by any particular catastrophe, and technology goes on advancing toward the physical limits, then it is possible to revive a cryonics patient (and yes you are the same person). There are negative possibilities (woken up in dystopia and not allowed to die) but they are exotic, not having equal probability weight to counterbalance the positive possibilities.”
is accurate. I really don’t have the expertise to debate this with you. I hope that you are right!
I think the logistical issues discussed above will be the wrench in the works, unfortunately.
Logistical issues are my main concern over cryonics as well. I don’t really doubt that in principle the technology could one day exist to revive a frozen person, my doubts are much more about the likelihood of cryonic storage getting me there despite mundane risks like corporate bankruptcy, political upheaval, natural disasters, fires, floods, fraud, etc., etc.
This sounds similar to pascal’s wager, and it has the same problems really. If you don’t see them I guess my response would be....
I have developed a very promising resurrection technology that works with greater reliability and less memory loss than cryonics. Paypal me $1,000 at shiftedshapes@gmail.com and note your name and social security number in the comments field and I will include you in the first wave of revivals.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/z0/the_pascals_wager_fallacy_fallacy/
only a fallacy if your assignment of probabilities here:
“And cryonics, of course, is the default extrapolation from known neuroscience: if memories are stored the way we now think, and cryonics organizations are not disturbed by any particular catastrophe, and technology goes on advancing toward the physical limits, then it is possible to revive a cryonics patient (and yes you are the same person). There are negative possibilities (woken up in dystopia and not allowed to die) but they are exotic, not having equal probability weight to counterbalance the positive possibilities.”
is accurate. I really don’t have the expertise to debate this with you. I hope that you are right!
I think the logistical issues discussed above will be the wrench in the works, unfortunately.
Logistical issues are my main concern over cryonics as well. I don’t really doubt that in principle the technology could one day exist to revive a frozen person, my doubts are much more about the likelihood of cryonic storage getting me there despite mundane risks like corporate bankruptcy, political upheaval, natural disasters, fires, floods, fraud, etc., etc.
For small enough probabilities the spirit of the calculation does change. That’s true. You then have to factor in the utility of the money spent.
ETA: that factor exists even with non-small probabilities, it just tends to be swamped by the other terms.
How does it work?
very well so far.
oh and it uses technology.
We have discussed Pascal’s Wager in depth here. Read the archives.