FWIW, an interesting counter-question is to ask you, nshepperd, to provide the criterion of truth, or at least how one might find it. I’ll warn you in advance, though, that Eliezer never adequately addresses this question in his writing because he is a pragmatist and so cuts off the line of inquiry before he’d have to address this question, thus appealing to him in insufficient (not that you necessarily would, but you’ve been linking him heavily and I want to cut short the need for a round of conversation where we get over this hurdle).
I’ll also say I have no problem with pragmatism per-se, and in fact I say as much in another comment because pragmatism is how you get on with living despite great doubt, but if you choose to go deeper on questions of epistemology than a pragmatic approach may at the moment demand, you’re forced to grapple with the program of the criterion head-on.
Don’t feel pressured to do this though; I just think you’ll find it an interesting exercise to try to pin it down and might gain some insight from it into the postrationalist worldview.
Supposing for the sake of argument that we agree with your view (that Eliezer’s perspective is insufficient to constitute a criterion of truth—a view I disagree with, but that is not the point of this comment), the question arises:
Why would we want to “go deeper on questions of epistemology than a pragmatic approach may at the moment demand”? By definition, it would seem, there is no practical (i.e. instrumental, i.e. pragmatic) reason to do so. Why, then?
(This is, of course, simply another way of saying “what do I gain from going ‘postrationalist’?”, which is a question I’ve never seen satisfactorily answered.)
P.S.: This isn’t just “the problem of induction”, a.k.a. “but you can never be 100% certain!”, is it? Surely that has been adequately dealt with, on Less Wrong…
Why would we want to “go deeper on questions of epistemology than a pragmatic approach may at the moment demand”? By definition, it would seem, there is no practical (i.e. instrumental, i.e. pragmatic) reason to do so. Why, then?
I’m careful above to say “than a pragmatic approach may at the moment demand”. Pragmatism has no universal ground to stand on: it’s always pragmatic to the task at hand. I have a need/interest to go deeper, but others may not so they do not and that’s fine; it only means that they bottom out where I want/need to go deeper, same as I take a pragmatic approach to understanding biochemistry or fluid dynamic and bottom out my inquiry much sooner than would a pharmacologist or an aeronautical engineer, respectively.
Conversely, if you start playing the “why go deeper, what’s the practical reason” game, you’ll quickly find there’s little reason for this site or any of the activity on it to exist since, after all, you can live just fine without it (and much else besides), but since people are interested or find themselves with a need to know more to serve some end they have, we’re here anyway.
P.S.: This isn’t just “the problem of induction”, a.k.a. “but you can never be 100% certain!”, is it? Surely that has been adequately dealt with, on Less Wrong…
Yep, that’s another guise this problems takes, and no we haven’t (and cant’!) fully solve it, although some great work has been done on figuring out how to better address this problem formally.
Why would we want to “go deeper on questions of epistemology than a pragmatic approach may at the moment demand”?
That depends who we are as an individual. Some individuals terminally value epistemic truth. Some individuals have made strident claims to know the truth.
FWIW, an interesting counter-question is to ask you, nshepperd, to provide the criterion of truth, or at least how one might find it. I’ll warn you in advance, though, that Eliezer never adequately addresses this question in his writing because he is a pragmatist and so cuts off the line of inquiry before he’d have to address this question, thus appealing to him in insufficient (not that you necessarily would, but you’ve been linking him heavily and I want to cut short the need for a round of conversation where we get over this hurdle).
I’ll also say I have no problem with pragmatism per-se, and in fact I say as much in another comment because pragmatism is how you get on with living despite great doubt, but if you choose to go deeper on questions of epistemology than a pragmatic approach may at the moment demand, you’re forced to grapple with the program of the criterion head-on.
Don’t feel pressured to do this though; I just think you’ll find it an interesting exercise to try to pin it down and might gain some insight from it into the postrationalist worldview.
Supposing for the sake of argument that we agree with your view (that Eliezer’s perspective is insufficient to constitute a criterion of truth—a view I disagree with, but that is not the point of this comment), the question arises:
Why would we want to “go deeper on questions of epistemology than a pragmatic approach may at the moment demand”? By definition, it would seem, there is no practical (i.e. instrumental, i.e. pragmatic) reason to do so. Why, then?
(This is, of course, simply another way of saying “what do I gain from going ‘postrationalist’?”, which is a question I’ve never seen satisfactorily answered.)
P.S.: This isn’t just “the problem of induction”, a.k.a. “but you can never be 100% certain!”, is it? Surely that has been adequately dealt with, on Less Wrong…
I’m careful above to say “than a pragmatic approach may at the moment demand”. Pragmatism has no universal ground to stand on: it’s always pragmatic to the task at hand. I have a need/interest to go deeper, but others may not so they do not and that’s fine; it only means that they bottom out where I want/need to go deeper, same as I take a pragmatic approach to understanding biochemistry or fluid dynamic and bottom out my inquiry much sooner than would a pharmacologist or an aeronautical engineer, respectively.
Conversely, if you start playing the “why go deeper, what’s the practical reason” game, you’ll quickly find there’s little reason for this site or any of the activity on it to exist since, after all, you can live just fine without it (and much else besides), but since people are interested or find themselves with a need to know more to serve some end they have, we’re here anyway.
Yep, that’s another guise this problems takes, and no we haven’t (and cant’!) fully solve it, although some great work has been done on figuring out how to better address this problem formally.
That depends who we are as an individual. Some individuals terminally value epistemic truth. Some individuals have made strident claims to know the truth.