Thanks. I would say that what we have in front of us are clear cases where someone have evidence for something else. In the example given, we have in front of us that both, e1 and e2 (together with the assumption that the NYT and WP are reliable) are evidence for g. So, presumably, there is an agreement between people offering the truth conditions for ‘e is evidence that h’ about the range of cases where there is evidence—while the is no agreement between people answering the question about the sound of the three, because the don’t agree on the range of cases where sound occurs. Otherwise, there would be no counterexamples such as the one that Achinstein tried to offer. If I offer some set of truth-conditions for Fa, and one of the data that I use to explain what it is for something to be F is the range of cases where F is applied, then if you present to me a case where F applies but it is not satisfied by the truth-conditions I offered, I will think that there is something wrong with that truth-conditions.
Trying to flesh out truth-conditions for a certain type of sentence is not the same thing as giving a definition. I’m not saying you’re completely wrong on this, I just really think that this is not merely verbal dispute. About what would I expect to accomplish by finding out the best set of truth-conditions for ‘e is evidence that h’, I would say that a certain concept that is used in the law, natural science and philosophy has now clear boundaries, and if some charlatan offers an argument in a public space for some conclusion of his interest, I can argue with him that he has no evidence for his claims.
Thanks for the reference to the fortitudinence concept—I didn’t know it yet.
Thanks. I would say that what we have in front of us are clear cases where someone have evidence for something else. In the example given, we have in front of us that both, e1 and e2 (together with the assumption that the NYT and WP are reliable) are evidence for g. So, presumably, there is an agreement between people offering the truth conditions for ‘e is evidence that h’ about the range of cases where there is evidence—while the is no agreement between people answering the question about the sound of the three, because the don’t agree on the range of cases where sound occurs. Otherwise, there would be no counterexamples such as the one that Achinstein tried to offer. If I offer some set of truth-conditions for Fa, and one of the data that I use to explain what it is for something to be F is the range of cases where F is applied, then if you present to me a case where F applies but it is not satisfied by the truth-conditions I offered, I will think that there is something wrong with that truth-conditions.
Trying to flesh out truth-conditions for a certain type of sentence is not the same thing as giving a definition. I’m not saying you’re completely wrong on this, I just really think that this is not merely verbal dispute. About what would I expect to accomplish by finding out the best set of truth-conditions for ‘e is evidence that h’, I would say that a certain concept that is used in the law, natural science and philosophy has now clear boundaries, and if some charlatan offers an argument in a public space for some conclusion of his interest, I can argue with him that he has no evidence for his claims.
Thanks for the reference to the fortitudinence concept—I didn’t know it yet.