Note that to someone not taking part in the experiment, the odds of the experimenter surviving are the same regardless of quantum immortality.
(At least, as far as I can tell. But this seems to suggest that if someone survives lots of QI experiments, they should update massively in favour of QI, but nobody else should update at all, which seems really weird to me.)
But this seems to suggest that if someone survives lots of QI experiments, they should update massively in favour of QI, but nobody else should update at all
It seems like an observer should likewise update in favor of QI in this case. If I know that you have survived many QI experiments, don’t I have just as much justification for updating in favor of QI as you do?
No, because from your perspective, me surviving is just as unlikely under QI as under not-QI. If I die on the result of a quantum coinflip, then the universe diverges into two branches. I can only observe the one where I survive, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist. You’re equally likely to observe either of them.
Note that to someone not taking part in the experiment, the odds of the experimenter surviving are the same regardless of quantum immortality.
(At least, as far as I can tell. But this seems to suggest that if someone survives lots of QI experiments, they should update massively in favour of QI, but nobody else should update at all, which seems really weird to me.)
That’s what I was trying to say in my parenthetical above.
And yes, anthropics is weird.
It seems like an observer should likewise update in favor of QI in this case. If I know that you have survived many QI experiments, don’t I have just as much justification for updating in favor of QI as you do?
No, because from your perspective, me surviving is just as unlikely under QI as under not-QI. If I die on the result of a quantum coinflip, then the universe diverges into two branches. I can only observe the one where I survive, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist. You’re equally likely to observe either of them.