The lack of expected utility estimates understates the case for working on FAI. Even if AGI is 100 years away or more, the safety issues might still be top or very high priority (though estimates comparing this against the value of other existential risk reduction efforts would be needed to determine this). Surely once we realize the potential impact of AGI, we shouldn’t delay working on safety concerns only until it is dangerously near. Some mathematical problems and engineering issues have taken humans hundreds of years to resolve (and some of course are still open/unsolved), so we should start immediately regardless of how far the estimate is (if there is no other imminent existential risk that takes precedent).
Edited to add: That said, I can see how introducing far future Fermi estimates at this stage could be problematic from an expository standpoint, given the intended audience.
I agree with the general sentiment. Though if human-level AI is very far away, I think there might be better things to do now than work on very direct safety measures. For instance, improve society’s general mechanisms for dealing with existential risks, or get more information about what’s going to happen and how to best prepare. I’m not sure if you meant to include these kinds of things.
Though if human-level AI is very fary away, I think there might be better things to do now than work on very direct safety measures.
Agreed. That is the meaning I intended by
estimates comparing this against the value of other existential risk reduction efforts would be needed to determine this [i.e. whether effort might be better used elsewhere]
Most people are not so exclusively interested in existential risk reduction; their decisions depend on how the development of AI compares to more pressing concerns. I think you can make a good case that normal humanitarians are significantly underestimating the likely impact of AI; if that’s true, then by making that case one might be able to marshall a lot of additional effort.
Echoing Katja: general improvements in individual and collective competence are also going to have a material effect on how the development of AI is handled. If AI is far off (e.g. if we were having this discussion in 1600) then it seems that those effects will tend to dominate the achievable direct impacts. Even if AI is developed relatively soon, it’s still plausible to me that institutional quality will be a big determinant of outcomes relative to safety work (though it’s less plausible on the margin, given just how little safety work there is).
I can imagine a future where all of the low-hanging fruit is taken in many domains, so that the best available interventions for altrusits concerned with long-term trajectories is focusing on improbable scenarios that are being neglected by the rest of the world because they don’t care as much. For better or worse, I don’t think we are there yet.
how the development of AI compares to more pressing concerns
Which concerns are more pressing? How was this assessed? I don’t object to other things being more important, but I do find the suggestion there are more pressing concerns if AI is a bit further out one of the least persuasive aspects of the readings given the lack of comparison & calculation.
2.
I agree with all of this, more or less. Perhaps I didn’t state my caveats strongly enough. I just want an explicit comparison attempted (e.g., given a 10% chance of AI in 20 years, 50% in 50 years, 70% within 100 years, etc., the expected value of working on AI now vs. synthetic biology risk reduction, healthy human life extension, making the species multi-planetary, raising the rationality waterline, etc.) and presented before accepting that AI is only worth thinking about if it’s near.
I think the “safety” problems (let’s call them FAI for the moment) will be harder than AI, and the philosophical problems we would need to address to decide what we ought to do will be more difficult than FAI. I see plenty of concern in LW and other futurist communities about AI “safety”, but approximately none about how to decide what the right thing to do is. “Preserving human values” is very possibly incoherent, and if it is coherent, preserving humans may be incompatible with it.
What did you find least persuasive in this week’s reading?
The lack of expected utility estimates understates the case for working on FAI. Even if AGI is 100 years away or more, the safety issues might still be top or very high priority (though estimates comparing this against the value of other existential risk reduction efforts would be needed to determine this). Surely once we realize the potential impact of AGI, we shouldn’t delay working on safety concerns only until it is dangerously near. Some mathematical problems and engineering issues have taken humans hundreds of years to resolve (and some of course are still open/unsolved), so we should start immediately regardless of how far the estimate is (if there is no other imminent existential risk that takes precedent).
Edited to add: That said, I can see how introducing far future Fermi estimates at this stage could be problematic from an expository standpoint, given the intended audience.
I agree with the general sentiment. Though if human-level AI is very far away, I think there might be better things to do now than work on very direct safety measures. For instance, improve society’s general mechanisms for dealing with existential risks, or get more information about what’s going to happen and how to best prepare. I’m not sure if you meant to include these kinds of things.
Agreed. That is the meaning I intended by
Some thoughts on this perspective:
Most people are not so exclusively interested in existential risk reduction; their decisions depend on how the development of AI compares to more pressing concerns. I think you can make a good case that normal humanitarians are significantly underestimating the likely impact of AI; if that’s true, then by making that case one might be able to marshall a lot of additional effort.
Echoing Katja: general improvements in individual and collective competence are also going to have a material effect on how the development of AI is handled. If AI is far off (e.g. if we were having this discussion in 1600) then it seems that those effects will tend to dominate the achievable direct impacts. Even if AI is developed relatively soon, it’s still plausible to me that institutional quality will be a big determinant of outcomes relative to safety work (though it’s less plausible on the margin, given just how little safety work there is).
I can imagine a future where all of the low-hanging fruit is taken in many domains, so that the best available interventions for altrusits concerned with long-term trajectories is focusing on improbable scenarios that are being neglected by the rest of the world because they don’t care as much. For better or worse, I don’t think we are there yet.
Which concerns are more pressing? How was this assessed? I don’t object to other things being more important, but I do find the suggestion there are more pressing concerns if AI is a bit further out one of the least persuasive aspects of the readings given the lack of comparison & calculation.
I agree with all of this, more or less. Perhaps I didn’t state my caveats strongly enough. I just want an explicit comparison attempted (e.g., given a 10% chance of AI in 20 years, 50% in 50 years, 70% within 100 years, etc., the expected value of working on AI now vs. synthetic biology risk reduction, healthy human life extension, making the species multi-planetary, raising the rationality waterline, etc.) and presented before accepting that AI is only worth thinking about if it’s near.
I think the “safety” problems (let’s call them FAI for the moment) will be harder than AI, and the philosophical problems we would need to address to decide what we ought to do will be more difficult than FAI. I see plenty of concern in LW and other futurist communities about AI “safety”, but approximately none about how to decide what the right thing to do is. “Preserving human values” is very possibly incoherent, and if it is coherent, preserving humans may be incompatible with it.