Condorcet is good. The one fundamental sense in which 3-2-1 is better is a better resistance to dark horse pathology, especially in the context of combined delegated and tactical voting. In Condorcet, in a highly-polarized situation, somebody 90% of everybody’s never heard of might be the Condorcet winner because each side rates them above the other. In 3-2-1, that person never makes it to the top 3.
This is not a strong argument, but it’s the one I have.
As regards IRV, it’s definitely worse than either.
Condorcet is good. The one fundamental sense in which 3-2-1 is better is a better resistance to dark horse pathology, especially in the context of combined delegated and tactical voting. In Condorcet, in a highly-polarized situation, somebody 90% of everybody’s never heard of might be the Condorcet winner because each side rates them above the other. In 3-2-1, that person never makes it to the top 3.
This is not a strong argument, but it’s the one I have.
As regards IRV, it’s definitely worse than either.