Bostrom’s definition requires the abilities of “taxation and territorial allocation.” There have been organizations that receive dedicated taxes that were not sovereign states. The medieval Catholic Church was one. This apparently got 10% of peasant’s incomes from tithes despite individual European states often warring. A current example is the EU.
A non-sovereign singleton (?) interests me because it might allow more diversity among different countries and lessen the totalitarianism risk, especially if it was limited to controlling existential risks. I have been trying of think of ways this could happen. Taking the church and its missionaries as inspiration, maybe advocates sent to different countries to raise support could do this.
I wonder if a non-sovereign singleton could reduce existential risk if different countries were hostile or even at war. If two countries had a war then I’m not sure how feasible it would be to restrain them from using any means available to win. But today’s wars aren’t always or even usually total: nuclear powers go to war and don’t use nuclear weapons.
For example, a singleton might want to prevent research into creating dangerous microbes that would kill everyone. Could a non-sovereign singleton could be powerful enough to prevent warring members from organizing dangerous research programs?
This is an important question since it affects how much “baggage” creating a singleton requires. If eliminating war is not necessary then that increases its prospects.
We might abstract the situation by imagining that in each country there are two groups, civic forces (A) and uncivic forces who don’t give a hoot about existential risk (B). Then if risk was high, survival would depend on maintaining one of two situations.
One is that A reliably dominates B in every country. The other is that while A can’t reliably muzzle B by itself in every country, dangerous domains of activity are made transparent on a global level and infractions by B in any country are detected. Afterward, the combined actions of A and other countries are sufficient to both stop B and punish it enough to deter future infractions. This seems more likely in a multipolar as opposed to bipolar world.
It seems like a singleton is more useful in maintaining the second situation although it would probably also help to create the first by keeping ideas flowing between countries and alerting people that they need to form an A group. For reducing existential risk we need ideas, monitoring and enforcement capacity. I wonder how relevant independent taxation is for tackling these.
I would just point out that Bostrom’s concept of a singleton is much broader than that of world government.
It is—but that’s the main relevant short-term version.
Bostrom’s definition requires the abilities of “taxation and territorial allocation.” There have been organizations that receive dedicated taxes that were not sovereign states. The medieval Catholic Church was one. This apparently got 10% of peasant’s incomes from tithes despite individual European states often warring. A current example is the EU.
A non-sovereign singleton (?) interests me because it might allow more diversity among different countries and lessen the totalitarianism risk, especially if it was limited to controlling existential risks. I have been trying of think of ways this could happen. Taking the church and its missionaries as inspiration, maybe advocates sent to different countries to raise support could do this.
I wonder if a non-sovereign singleton could reduce existential risk if different countries were hostile or even at war. If two countries had a war then I’m not sure how feasible it would be to restrain them from using any means available to win. But today’s wars aren’t always or even usually total: nuclear powers go to war and don’t use nuclear weapons.
For example, a singleton might want to prevent research into creating dangerous microbes that would kill everyone. Could a non-sovereign singleton could be powerful enough to prevent warring members from organizing dangerous research programs?
This is an important question since it affects how much “baggage” creating a singleton requires. If eliminating war is not necessary then that increases its prospects.
We might abstract the situation by imagining that in each country there are two groups, civic forces (A) and uncivic forces who don’t give a hoot about existential risk (B). Then if risk was high, survival would depend on maintaining one of two situations.
One is that A reliably dominates B in every country. The other is that while A can’t reliably muzzle B by itself in every country, dangerous domains of activity are made transparent on a global level and infractions by B in any country are detected. Afterward, the combined actions of A and other countries are sufficient to both stop B and punish it enough to deter future infractions. This seems more likely in a multipolar as opposed to bipolar world.
It seems like a singleton is more useful in maintaining the second situation although it would probably also help to create the first by keeping ideas flowing between countries and alerting people that they need to form an A group. For reducing existential risk we need ideas, monitoring and enforcement capacity. I wonder how relevant independent taxation is for tackling these.