I, like others, can do the maths just fine, so what? How does it follow that circular preferences over very long chains of remotely possible pairs of choices should cause me to doubt strong moral intuition? Because I would, under carefully contrived conditions, lose against the allegedly optimal solution… As for grandstanding, hah! To presume to call this brand of consequentialism “rationality” is already quite rhetorical. Never mind warm fuzzies, bare swords, flames, and chimpanzees.
I, like others, can do the maths just fine, so what? How does it follow that circular preferences over very long chains of remotely possible pairs of choices should cause me to doubt strong moral intuition? Because I would, under carefully contrived conditions, lose against the allegedly optimal solution… As for grandstanding, hah! To presume to call this brand of consequentialism “rationality” is already quite rhetorical. Never mind warm fuzzies, bare swords, flames, and chimpanzees.