Sure, but how is that relevant? There are people who want to accelerate the destruction of the world because that would bring in the Messiah faster—so what?
By analogy, what are some things that decrease my credence in thinking that humans will survive to a “post-human stage.” For me, some are 1) We seem terrible at coordination problems at a policy level, 2) We are not terribly cautious in developing new, potentially dangerous, technology, 3) some people are actively trying to end the world for religious/ideological reasons. So as I learn more about ISIS and its ideology and how it is becoming increasingly popular, since they are literally trying to end the world, it further decreases my credence that we will make it to a post-human stage. I am not saying that my learning information about them is actually changing the odds, just that it is giving me more information with which to make my knowledge of the already-existing world more accurate. It’s Bayesianism.
For another analogy, my credence for the idea that “NYC will be hit by a dirty bomb in the next 20 years” was pretty low until I read about the ideology and methods of radical Islam and the poor containment of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union. My reading about these people’s ideas did not change anything, however, their ideas are causally relevant, and my knowledge of this factor increase my credence of that as a possibility.
For one final analogy, if there is a stack of well-shuffled playing cards in front of me, what is my credence that the bottom card is a queen of hearts? 1⁄52. Now let’s say I flip the top two cards, and they are a 5 and a king. What is my credence now that the bottom card is a queen of hearts? 1⁄50. Now let’s say I go through the next 25 cards and none of them are the queen of hearts. What is my credence now that the bottom card is the queen of hearts? 1 in 25. The card at the bottom has not changed. The reality is in place. All I am doing is gaining information which helps me get a sense of location. I do want to clarify though, that I am reasoning with you as a two-boxer. I think one-boxers might view specific instances like this differently. Again, I am agnostic on who is correct for these purposes.
Now to bring it back to the point, what are some obstacles to your credence to thinking you are in a simulation? For me, the easy ones that come to mind are: 1) I do not know if it is physically possible, 2) I am skeptical that we will survive long enough to get the technology, 3) I do not know why people would bother making simulations.
One and two or unchanged by the one-box/Calvinism thing, but when we realize both that there are a lot of one-boxers, and that these one-boxers, when faced with an analogous decision, would almost certainly want to create simulations with pleasant afterlives, then I suddenly have some sense of why #3 might not be an obstacle.
My issue with this phrasing is that these two (and other) types are solely the product of your imagination. We have one (1) known example of intelligent species. That is very much insufficient to start talking about “types”—one can certainly imagine them, but that has nothing to do with reality.
I think you are reading something into what I said that was not meant. That said, I am still not sure what that was. I can say the exact thing in different language if it helps. “If some humans want to make simulations of humans, it is possible we are in a simulation made by humans. If humans do not want to make simulations of humans, there is no chance that we are in a simulation made by humans.” That was the full extent of what I was saying, with nothing else implied about other species or anything else.
Which new information?
Does the fact that we construct and play video games argue for the claim that we are NPCs in a video game? Does the fact that we do bio lab experiments argue for the claim that we live in a petri dish?
Second point first. How could we be in a petri dish? How could we be NPCs in a video game? How would that fit with other observations and existing knowledge? My current credence is near zero, but I am open to new information. Hit me.
Now the first point. The new information is something like: “When we use what we know about human nature, we have reason to believe that people might make simulations. In particular, the existence of one-boxers who are happy to ignore our ‘common sense’ notions of causality, for whatever reason, and the existence of people who want an afterlife, when combined, suggests that there might be a large minority of people who will ‘act out’ creating simulations in the hope that they are in one.” A LW user sent me a message directing me to this post, which might help you understand my point: http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/l18/simulation_argument_meets_decision_theory/
People believing in Islam are very relevant to the chances of the future caliphate. People believing in Islam are not terribly relevant to the chances that in our present we live under the watchful gaze of Allah.
The weird thing about trying to determine good self-locating beliefs when looking at the question of simulations is that you do not get the benefit of self-locating in time like that. We are talking about simulations of worlds/civilizations as they grow and develop into technological maturity. This is why Bostrom called them “ancestor simulations” in the original article (which you might read if you haven’t, it is only 12 pages, and if Bostrom is Newton, I am like a 7th grader half-assing an essay due tomorrow after reading the Wikipedia page.)
As for people believing in Allah making it more likely that he exists, I fully agree that that is nonsense. The difference here is that part of the belief in “Am I in a simulation made by people” relies CAUSALLY on whether or not people would ever make simulations. If they would not, the chance is zero. If they would, whether or not they should, the chance is something higher.
For an analogy again, imagine I am trying to determine my credence that the (uncontacted) Sentinelese people engage in cannibalism. I do not know anything about them specifically, but my credence is going to be something much higher than zero because I am aware that lots of human civilizations practice cannibalism. I have some relevant evidence about human nature and decision making that allows other knowledge of how people act to put some bounds on my credence about this group. Now imagine I am trying to determine my credence that the Sentinelese engage in widespread coprophagia. Again, I do not know anything about them. However, I do know that no other recorded human society has ever been recorded to do this. I can use this information about other peoples’ behavior and thought processes, to adjust my credence about the Sentinelese. In this case, giving me near certainty that they do not.
If we know that a bunch of people have beliefs that will lead to them trying to create “ancestor” simulations of humans, then we have more reason to think that a different set of humans have done this already, and we are in one of the simulations.
The probability is non-zero, but it’s not affecting any decisions I’m making. I still don’t see why the number of one-boxers around should cause me to update this probability to anything more significant.
Do you still not think this after reading this post? Please let me know. I either need to work on communicating this a different way or try to pin down where this is wrong and what I am missing….
Also, thank you for all of the time you have put into this. I sincerely appreciate the feedback. I also appreciate why and how this has been frustrating, re: “cult,” and hope I have been able to mitigate the unpleasantness of this at least a bit.
Why do you talk in terms of credence? In Bayesianism your belief of how likely something is is just a probability, so we’re talking about probabilities, right?
I am not saying that my learning information about them is actually changing the odds, just that it is giving me more information with which to make my knowledge of the already-existing world more accurate.
Sure, OK.
Now to bring it back to the point, what are some obstacles to your credence to thinking you are in a simulation?
Aren’t you doing some rather severe privileging of the hypothesis?
The world has all kinds of people. Some want to destroy the world (and that should increase my credence that the world will get destroyed); some want electronic heavens (and that should increase my credence that there will be simulated heavens); some want break out of the circle of samsara (and that should increase my credence that any death will be truly final); some want a lot of beer (and that should increase my credence that the future will be full of SuperExtraSpecialBudLight), etc. etc. And as the Egan’s Law says, “It all adds up to normality”.
want to create simulations with pleasant afterlives
I think you’re being very Christianity-centric and Christians are only what, about a third of the world’s population? I still don’t know why people would create imprecise simulations of those who lived and died long ago.
If some humans want to make simulations of humans, it is possible we are in a simulation made by humans. If humans do not want to make simulations of humans, there is no chance that we are in a simulation made by humans.
Locate this statement on a timeline. Let’s go back a couple of hundred years: do humans want to make simulations of humans? No, they don’t.
Things change and eternal truths are rare. Future is uncertain and judgements of what people of far future might want to do or not to do are not reliable.
How could we be in a petri dish? How could we be NPCs in a video game? How would that fit with other observations and existing knowledge?
Easily enough. You assume—for no good reason known to me—that a simulation must mimic the real world to the best of its ability. I don’t see why this should be so. A petri dish, in way, is a controlled simulation of, say, the growth and competition between different strains of bacteria (or yeast, or mold, etc.). Imagine an advanced (post-human or, say, alien) civilization doing historical research through simulations, running A/B tests on the XXI-century human history. If we change X, will the history go in the Y direction? Let’s see. That’s a petri dish—or a video game, take your pick.
When we use what we know about human nature, we have reason to believe that people might make simulations.
That’s not a comforting thought. From what I know about human nature, people will want to make simulations where the simulation-makers are Gods.
that there might be a large minority of people who will ‘act out’ creating simulations in the hope that they are in one
And since I two-box, I still say that they can “act out” anything they want, it’s not going to change their circumstances.
The difference here is that part of the belief in “Am I in a simulation made by people” relies CAUSALLY on whether or not people would ever make simulations.
Nope, not would ever make, but have ever made. The past and the future are still different. If you think you can reverse the time arrow, well, say so explicitly.
because I am aware that lots of human civilizations
Yes, you have many known to you examples so you can estimate the probability that one more, unknown to you, has or does not have certain features. But...
more reason to think that a different set of humans have done this already
...you can’t do this here. You know only a single (though diverse) set of humans. There is nothing to derive probabilities from. And if you want to use narrow sub-populations, well, we’re back to privileging the hypothesis again. Lots of humans believe and intend a lot of different things. Why pick this one?
Do you still not think this after reading this post?
Yep, still. If what the large number of people around believe affected me this much, I would be communing with my best friend Jesus instead :-P
why and how this has been frustrating
Hasn’t been frustrating at all. I like intellectual exercises in twisting, untwisting, bending, folding, etc.. :-) I don’t find this conversation unpleasant.
By analogy, what are some things that decrease my credence in thinking that humans will survive to a “post-human stage.” For me, some are 1) We seem terrible at coordination problems at a policy level, 2) We are not terribly cautious in developing new, potentially dangerous, technology, 3) some people are actively trying to end the world for religious/ideological reasons. So as I learn more about ISIS and its ideology and how it is becoming increasingly popular, since they are literally trying to end the world, it further decreases my credence that we will make it to a post-human stage. I am not saying that my learning information about them is actually changing the odds, just that it is giving me more information with which to make my knowledge of the already-existing world more accurate. It’s Bayesianism.
For another analogy, my credence for the idea that “NYC will be hit by a dirty bomb in the next 20 years” was pretty low until I read about the ideology and methods of radical Islam and the poor containment of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union. My reading about these people’s ideas did not change anything, however, their ideas are causally relevant, and my knowledge of this factor increase my credence of that as a possibility.
For one final analogy, if there is a stack of well-shuffled playing cards in front of me, what is my credence that the bottom card is a queen of hearts? 1⁄52. Now let’s say I flip the top two cards, and they are a 5 and a king. What is my credence now that the bottom card is a queen of hearts? 1⁄50. Now let’s say I go through the next 25 cards and none of them are the queen of hearts. What is my credence now that the bottom card is the queen of hearts? 1 in 25. The card at the bottom has not changed. The reality is in place. All I am doing is gaining information which helps me get a sense of location. I do want to clarify though, that I am reasoning with you as a two-boxer. I think one-boxers might view specific instances like this differently. Again, I am agnostic on who is correct for these purposes.
Now to bring it back to the point, what are some obstacles to your credence to thinking you are in a simulation? For me, the easy ones that come to mind are: 1) I do not know if it is physically possible, 2) I am skeptical that we will survive long enough to get the technology, 3) I do not know why people would bother making simulations.
One and two or unchanged by the one-box/Calvinism thing, but when we realize both that there are a lot of one-boxers, and that these one-boxers, when faced with an analogous decision, would almost certainly want to create simulations with pleasant afterlives, then I suddenly have some sense of why #3 might not be an obstacle.
I think you are reading something into what I said that was not meant. That said, I am still not sure what that was. I can say the exact thing in different language if it helps. “If some humans want to make simulations of humans, it is possible we are in a simulation made by humans. If humans do not want to make simulations of humans, there is no chance that we are in a simulation made by humans.” That was the full extent of what I was saying, with nothing else implied about other species or anything else.
Second point first. How could we be in a petri dish? How could we be NPCs in a video game? How would that fit with other observations and existing knowledge? My current credence is near zero, but I am open to new information. Hit me.
Now the first point. The new information is something like: “When we use what we know about human nature, we have reason to believe that people might make simulations. In particular, the existence of one-boxers who are happy to ignore our ‘common sense’ notions of causality, for whatever reason, and the existence of people who want an afterlife, when combined, suggests that there might be a large minority of people who will ‘act out’ creating simulations in the hope that they are in one.” A LW user sent me a message directing me to this post, which might help you understand my point: http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/l18/simulation_argument_meets_decision_theory/
The weird thing about trying to determine good self-locating beliefs when looking at the question of simulations is that you do not get the benefit of self-locating in time like that. We are talking about simulations of worlds/civilizations as they grow and develop into technological maturity. This is why Bostrom called them “ancestor simulations” in the original article (which you might read if you haven’t, it is only 12 pages, and if Bostrom is Newton, I am like a 7th grader half-assing an essay due tomorrow after reading the Wikipedia page.)
As for people believing in Allah making it more likely that he exists, I fully agree that that is nonsense. The difference here is that part of the belief in “Am I in a simulation made by people” relies CAUSALLY on whether or not people would ever make simulations. If they would not, the chance is zero. If they would, whether or not they should, the chance is something higher.
For an analogy again, imagine I am trying to determine my credence that the (uncontacted) Sentinelese people engage in cannibalism. I do not know anything about them specifically, but my credence is going to be something much higher than zero because I am aware that lots of human civilizations practice cannibalism. I have some relevant evidence about human nature and decision making that allows other knowledge of how people act to put some bounds on my credence about this group. Now imagine I am trying to determine my credence that the Sentinelese engage in widespread coprophagia. Again, I do not know anything about them. However, I do know that no other recorded human society has ever been recorded to do this. I can use this information about other peoples’ behavior and thought processes, to adjust my credence about the Sentinelese. In this case, giving me near certainty that they do not.
If we know that a bunch of people have beliefs that will lead to them trying to create “ancestor” simulations of humans, then we have more reason to think that a different set of humans have done this already, and we are in one of the simulations.
Do you still not think this after reading this post? Please let me know. I either need to work on communicating this a different way or try to pin down where this is wrong and what I am missing….
Also, thank you for all of the time you have put into this. I sincerely appreciate the feedback. I also appreciate why and how this has been frustrating, re: “cult,” and hope I have been able to mitigate the unpleasantness of this at least a bit.
Why do you talk in terms of credence? In Bayesianism your belief of how likely something is is just a probability, so we’re talking about probabilities, right?
Sure, OK.
Aren’t you doing some rather severe privileging of the hypothesis?
The world has all kinds of people. Some want to destroy the world (and that should increase my credence that the world will get destroyed); some want electronic heavens (and that should increase my credence that there will be simulated heavens); some want break out of the circle of samsara (and that should increase my credence that any death will be truly final); some want a lot of beer (and that should increase my credence that the future will be full of SuperExtraSpecialBudLight), etc. etc. And as the Egan’s Law says, “It all adds up to normality”.
I think you’re being very Christianity-centric and Christians are only what, about a third of the world’s population? I still don’t know why people would create imprecise simulations of those who lived and died long ago.
Locate this statement on a timeline. Let’s go back a couple of hundred years: do humans want to make simulations of humans? No, they don’t.
Things change and eternal truths are rare. Future is uncertain and judgements of what people of far future might want to do or not to do are not reliable.
Easily enough. You assume—for no good reason known to me—that a simulation must mimic the real world to the best of its ability. I don’t see why this should be so. A petri dish, in way, is a controlled simulation of, say, the growth and competition between different strains of bacteria (or yeast, or mold, etc.). Imagine an advanced (post-human or, say, alien) civilization doing historical research through simulations, running A/B tests on the XXI-century human history. If we change X, will the history go in the Y direction? Let’s see. That’s a petri dish—or a video game, take your pick.
That’s not a comforting thought. From what I know about human nature, people will want to make simulations where the simulation-makers are Gods.
And since I two-box, I still say that they can “act out” anything they want, it’s not going to change their circumstances.
Nope, not would ever make, but have ever made. The past and the future are still different. If you think you can reverse the time arrow, well, say so explicitly.
Yes, you have many known to you examples so you can estimate the probability that one more, unknown to you, has or does not have certain features. But...
...you can’t do this here. You know only a single (though diverse) set of humans. There is nothing to derive probabilities from. And if you want to use narrow sub-populations, well, we’re back to privileging the hypothesis again. Lots of humans believe and intend a lot of different things. Why pick this one?
Yep, still. If what the large number of people around believe affected me this much, I would be communing with my best friend Jesus instead :-P
Hasn’t been frustrating at all. I like intellectual exercises in twisting, untwisting, bending, folding, etc.. :-) I don’t find this conversation unpleasant.
Nah, it’s not you who is Exhibit A here :-/