I have 1 and 2. I don’t really understand the others.
With regard to 1, beside internal monologue, I can also imagine sounds, other people’s voices, music, etc. I’m especially adept at creating elaborate internal musical compositions which is surprising because I have absolutely no interest in music (I play no instruments and never purchase or download music). I’ll often get songs and tunes “stuck in my head” that are pure invention (I can’t imagine great lyrics though and usually fill gaps with nonsense words). Most of my internal monologue is directed at an audience. Usually when I’m thinking of something I’m thinking of how I’d explain it to another person, sometimes the audience is generic but often it’s more specific. When I press my tongue to the top of my mouth, the very same things I can’t pronounce verbally, I can’t pronounce internally either. It also alters my ability to imagine sounds, which makes me think my ability to imagine sounds is derivative of my ability to produce them verbally (however, I’m seemingly much better at producing sounds and impersonations internally, although I think this can be explained by the lack of feedback).
My visual imagination is very good. When I was younger, I was very interested in movies, and would imagine ideas for movies in elaborate detail. I can still recall many of them in vivid detail. I had quite good artistic talent at that time (now neglected) which I think is strongly related to visual imagination (I tend to think that developing artistic talent and/or appreciation develops the visual imagination rather than vice versa). Wittgenstein’s comments on the imagination fit my experience of mental imagery perfectly. Wittgenstein criticised Galton’s study because it makes no sense to say that I discovered something about my mental imagery. I can imagine a house and, if you ask me what colour the door is, I can imagine that it has a red door. But this isn’t the same as discovering it has a red door (as I could with a real house or a photo of a house had I not noticed the colour of the door). I find that this explanation fits the strange and elusive nature of the mental imagery I experience perfectly and makes the limitations of mental imagery clear to me.
I find it very difficult to imagine smells and scents voluntarily. Sometimes it happens involuntarily. Tactile imagery tends to accompany other types of mental imagery rather than appear alone. I have moments of insight and elation but can’t say I experience any “thoughts” that aren’t sense-related in some way.
I have 1 and 2. I don’t really understand the others.
With regard to 1, beside internal monologue, I can also imagine sounds, other people’s voices, music, etc. I’m especially adept at creating elaborate internal musical compositions which is surprising because I have absolutely no interest in music (I play no instruments and never purchase or download music). I’ll often get songs and tunes “stuck in my head” that are pure invention (I can’t imagine great lyrics though and usually fill gaps with nonsense words). Most of my internal monologue is directed at an audience. Usually when I’m thinking of something I’m thinking of how I’d explain it to another person, sometimes the audience is generic but often it’s more specific. When I press my tongue to the top of my mouth, the very same things I can’t pronounce verbally, I can’t pronounce internally either. It also alters my ability to imagine sounds, which makes me think my ability to imagine sounds is derivative of my ability to produce them verbally (however, I’m seemingly much better at producing sounds and impersonations internally, although I think this can be explained by the lack of feedback).
My visual imagination is very good. When I was younger, I was very interested in movies, and would imagine ideas for movies in elaborate detail. I can still recall many of them in vivid detail. I had quite good artistic talent at that time (now neglected) which I think is strongly related to visual imagination (I tend to think that developing artistic talent and/or appreciation develops the visual imagination rather than vice versa). Wittgenstein’s comments on the imagination fit my experience of mental imagery perfectly. Wittgenstein criticised Galton’s study because it makes no sense to say that I discovered something about my mental imagery. I can imagine a house and, if you ask me what colour the door is, I can imagine that it has a red door. But this isn’t the same as discovering it has a red door (as I could with a real house or a photo of a house had I not noticed the colour of the door). I find that this explanation fits the strange and elusive nature of the mental imagery I experience perfectly and makes the limitations of mental imagery clear to me.
I find it very difficult to imagine smells and scents voluntarily. Sometimes it happens involuntarily. Tactile imagery tends to accompany other types of mental imagery rather than appear alone. I have moments of insight and elation but can’t say I experience any “thoughts” that aren’t sense-related in some way.