“At the most basic level of description, things—the quantum fields or branes or whatever—just do what they do. They don’t do it nondeterministically, but they also don’t do it deterministically”
How do you know? If that claim isn’t based on a model, what is it based on?
I’m happy to reply that the message of my comment as a whole applies to this part—my claim about “what things do at a basic level of description” is a meta-model claim about what you can say about things at different levels of description.
It’s human nature to interpret this as a claim that things have some essence of “just doing what they do” that is a competitor to the essences of determinism and nondeterminism, but there is no such essence for the same reasons I’m already talking about in the comment. Maybe I could have worded it more carefully to prevent this reading, but I figure that would sacrifice more clarity than it gained.
The point is not about some “basic nature of things,” the point is about some “basic level of description.” We might imagine someone saying “I know there are some deterministic models of atoms and some nondeterministic models, but are the atoms really deterministic or not?” Where this “really” seems to mean some atheoretic direct understanding of the nature of atoms. My point, in short, is that atheoretic understanding is fruitless (“It’s just one damn thing after another”) and the instinct that says it’s desirable is misleading.
“much better explanation of wetness would be in terms of surface tension and intermolecular forces and so on”
Why? Because they are real properties?
Because they’re part of a detailed model of the world that helps tell a “functional and causal story” about the phenomenon. If I was going to badmouth one set of essences just to prop up another, I would have said so :P
You can explain away some properties in terms of others, but there is, going to be some residue
My point is that this residue is never going to be the “Real Properties,” they’re just going to be the same theory-laden properties as always.
What makes a theory of everything a theory of everything is not that it provides a final answer for which properties are the real properties that atoms have in some atheoretic direct way. It’s that it provides a useful framework in which we can understand all (literally all) sorts of stuff.
I’m happy to reply that the message of my comment as a whole applies to this part
I found parts of your comment as a whole to be unclear or underargued,which is why I asked the questions l.
—my claim about “what things do at a basic level of description” is a meta-model claim about what you can say about things at different levels of description.
I don’t see how you can know what the most basic level of description looks like. (I previously phrased that as a question, which did me no good).
A claim to the effect that no theoretical term applies atheoretically might prove too much - - it might be more of a general point than the OP was getting at.
We might imagine someone saying “I know there are some deterministic models of atoms and some nondeterministic models, but are the atoms really deterministic or not?”
Well, there a kind of fake indeterminism based on an observers lack of information. Someone could asking a question about that rather than what is true atheoretically.
Because they’re part of a detailed model of the world that helps tell a “functional and causal story” about the phenomenon. If I was going to badmouth one set of essences just to prop up another, I would have said so
You seem to be happy enough with functional and causal.
My point is that this residue is never going to be the “Real Properties,” they’re just going to be the same theory-laden properties as always
Are you arguing it or stating it?
What makes a theory of everything a theory of everything is not that it provides a final answer for which properties are the real properties that atoms have in some atheoretic direct way. It’s that it provides a useful framework in which we can understand all (literally all) sorts of stuff
Maybe. Physicalism asserts the opposite, so an argument would be helpful.
I’m happy to reply that the message of my comment as a whole applies to this part—my claim about “what things do at a basic level of description” is a meta-model claim about what you can say about things at different levels of description.
It’s human nature to interpret this as a claim that things have some essence of “just doing what they do” that is a competitor to the essences of determinism and nondeterminism, but there is no such essence for the same reasons I’m already talking about in the comment. Maybe I could have worded it more carefully to prevent this reading, but I figure that would sacrifice more clarity than it gained.
The point is not about some “basic nature of things,” the point is about some “basic level of description.” We might imagine someone saying “I know there are some deterministic models of atoms and some nondeterministic models, but are the atoms really deterministic or not?” Where this “really” seems to mean some atheoretic direct understanding of the nature of atoms. My point, in short, is that atheoretic understanding is fruitless (“It’s just one damn thing after another”) and the instinct that says it’s desirable is misleading.
Because they’re part of a detailed model of the world that helps tell a “functional and causal story” about the phenomenon. If I was going to badmouth one set of essences just to prop up another, I would have said so :P
My point is that this residue is never going to be the “Real Properties,” they’re just going to be the same theory-laden properties as always.
What makes a theory of everything a theory of everything is not that it provides a final answer for which properties are the real properties that atoms have in some atheoretic direct way. It’s that it provides a useful framework in which we can understand all (literally all) sorts of stuff.
I found parts of your comment as a whole to be unclear or underargued,which is why I asked the questions l.
I don’t see how you can know what the most basic level of description looks like. (I previously phrased that as a question, which did me no good).
A claim to the effect that no theoretical term applies atheoretically might prove too much - - it might be more of a general point than the OP was getting at.
Well, there a kind of fake indeterminism based on an observers lack of information. Someone could asking a question about that rather than what is true atheoretically.
You seem to be happy enough with functional and causal.
Are you arguing it or stating it?
Maybe. Physicalism asserts the opposite, so an argument would be helpful.