I read this a while back but have been putting off writing about it while I thought about it (and until I reread at least parts of it). Some parts I think are mistaken and some need more work, but it is mostly an interesting critique of Evolutionary Psychology.
The hardest to follow, and where I think the most potential benefit lies, is in Chapter 4 on modularity of minds. One big problem for evolutionary psychology is its claim for “massive modularity” versus the well established plasticity of minds at the neural level, and that all memory and mental function relies completely on the neural plasticity.
I read that, and many other criticisms, before I bought the book. Some of the criticisms are accurate, others miss, and most there is no real way to decide rationally either way. As for most of the criticisms from the EvoPsych direction, they are of the 3 chapters on specific adaptation claims that I haven’t read, I am more interested in the basis, and especially as I pointed out above the conflict between evo-psyc and neural plasticity which I don’t think even this paper addresses adequately (and the others mostly or entirely ignore). I’m not going to respond any more right now, like I wrote above I need to think through it a bit more.
I haven’t read Adapting Minds, but I’ve seen responses to it by evolutionary psychologists. You can find a bunch of them on Cosmides’ and Tooby’s website
After what might seem like a reasonable review of the mate preferences literature, Buller concludes that evolutionary psychologists are mistaken in their claims of a universal male preference for relatively young women as mates and a universal female preference for high status men as mates. Male mating preferences, Buller argues, although sometimes containing a preference for young women, are far more complicated. We agree with this conclusion, but not because he demolishes the empirical evidence, or because his theoretical acumen is sharper than the many evolutionary psychologists who have written on this issue. Instead, we agree because the “alternative” he proposes is essentially the reigning consensus among evolutionary psychologists. He fails to understand that evolutionary psychologists also believe that people in different situations will behave differently. For instance, college aged fraternity boys and elderly widowers face different circumstances and are at different life-history stages; no one would expect them to have identical mates. Regarding the female preference for high status males, Buller goes even further, arguing that it is in fact non-existent—an artifact of skewed samples and mating preferences for similar others. In this conclusion, he is simply wrong, and we present evidence explaining why below. Indeed, much of the evidence we will cite is in papers he cites during his criticism, except that he repeatedly misconstrues the findings along the way.
...
Buller’s arguments to the contrary have been shown to be false, superfluous, or a slight variant on the consensus of evolutionary psychologists. Throughout this response we have relied mainly on data and theories that were published prior to Buller’s book. Most of this work was available in papers he himself cites or was published by researchers whose work he is criticizing. Theories of shifting strategies
have always been part of evolutionary psychologists’ theories. Buller has created a straw man: He implies that evolutionary psychologists have hypothesized that each sex has a single-minded focus on only one characteristic of potential mates—youth or status—regardless of other factors. In reality, evolutionary psychologists have always included multiple preferences in their theories of mate choice (see Buss’ textbook, 2004). He suggests that homogamy is a potent force in mating and that it explains many empirical phenomena for both sexes. This isn’t new or an alternative: Over a decade ago, Kenrick and Keefe (1992) incorporated similarity preferences into their evolutionary model. Buller’s one original hypothesis, the age-adjusted homogamy hypothesis, fails to convincingly account for any previously unexplained data.
Another negative review from Machery and Barrett concluded:
Buller has failed to mount a successful challenge to evolutionary psychology. Most of his critiques of the theoretical commitments
of evolutionary psychology miss the mark. Some misrepresent the literature; others are fallacious, drawing untenable conclusions from admittedly uncontroversial premises. His attacks against the empirical findings
are similarly erroneous. Most important, if Buller were right, there would
remain little place for a science at the intersection of psychology and
evolutionary biology. If, as he claims, Buller actually endorses evolutionary
approaches to human behavior, but simply wants to raise the standards
of the field, his book, alas, fails to do so.
The arguments of Buller’s critics seem well-reasoned and well-cited, though someone who has read his book would have to confirm that they are fair to him.
Has anyone from evolutionary biology proper weighed in with a critique of Buller? Even Buller’s critics admit that the book was well received generally in the academic press.
Buller argues that our minds are not adapted to the Pleistocene, but, like the immune system, are continually adapting, over both evolutionary time and individual lifetimes. We must move beyond the reigning orthodoxy of evolutionary psychology to reach an accurate understanding of how human psychology is influenced by evolution. When we do, Buller claims, we will abandon not only the quest for human nature but the very idea of human nature itself.
I personally have nothing against the term “Human Nature”. But I think it is easy to reconstruct Buller’s meaning here. Our “nature” has clearly evolved; evolution takes place (in part) as a result of variation in a population; evolution of our “nature” is still taking place; hence there is still variation in the “nature” of the human population; hence the whole concept that the species has an essential “Human Nature” is flawed. We are diverse.
I’m not sure I would want to call that kind of word chopping “clueless”. But I would point out that the diversity in human nature is the result of the last 150,000 years or so of our evolution, whereas our shared evolutionary history (creating an “essence” of human nature) spans a period roughly 40 times as long.
Buller’s Adapting Minds
I read this a while back but have been putting off writing about it while I thought about it (and until I reread at least parts of it). Some parts I think are mistaken and some need more work, but it is mostly an interesting critique of Evolutionary Psychology.
The hardest to follow, and where I think the most potential benefit lies, is in Chapter 4 on modularity of minds. One big problem for evolutionary psychology is its claim for “massive modularity” versus the well established plasticity of minds at the neural level, and that all memory and mental function relies completely on the neural plasticity.
It’s a good book, but see also Debunking Adapting Minds.
I read that, and many other criticisms, before I bought the book. Some of the criticisms are accurate, others miss, and most there is no real way to decide rationally either way. As for most of the criticisms from the EvoPsych direction, they are of the 3 chapters on specific adaptation claims that I haven’t read, I am more interested in the basis, and especially as I pointed out above the conflict between evo-psyc and neural plasticity which I don’t think even this paper addresses adequately (and the others mostly or entirely ignore). I’m not going to respond any more right now, like I wrote above I need to think through it a bit more.
I haven’t read Adapting Minds, but I’ve seen responses to it by evolutionary psychologists. You can find a bunch of them on Cosmides’ and Tooby’s website
See this one by Delton, Robertson, and Kenrick for instance:
...
Another negative review from Machery and Barrett concluded:
The arguments of Buller’s critics seem well-reasoned and well-cited, though someone who has read his book would have to confirm that they are fair to him.
Has anyone from evolutionary biology proper weighed in with a critique of Buller? Even Buller’s critics admit that the book was well received generally in the academic press.
Amazon’s summary has:
http://www.amazon.com/Adapting-Minds-Evolutionary-Psychology-Persistent/dp/0262524600/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1281740042
IMO, that does an excellent job of making the author sound clueless.
I personally have nothing against the term “Human Nature”. But I think it is easy to reconstruct Buller’s meaning here. Our “nature” has clearly evolved; evolution takes place (in part) as a result of variation in a population; evolution of our “nature” is still taking place; hence there is still variation in the “nature” of the human population; hence the whole concept that the species has an essential “Human Nature” is flawed. We are diverse.
I’m not sure I would want to call that kind of word chopping “clueless”. But I would point out that the diversity in human nature is the result of the last 150,000 years or so of our evolution, whereas our shared evolutionary history (creating an “essence” of human nature) spans a period roughly 40 times as long.
It reminds me of those who argue against:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_intelligence_factor
...on the grounds that intelligence is composed of many diverse abilities.
Someone making such a complaint about the term “Human Nature” simply hasn’t bothered to understand what the term is intended to refer to.