It seems like a lot of this widespread hostility (the reaction to Harald Eia’s Hjernevask is a good example of this hostility) stems from the fact that ev. psych is new.
Not just that; certain political positions believe (correctly or incorrectly) that sociobiology or evolutionary psychology is counter to their worldviews. See Defenders of theTruth by Ullica Segerstrale.
While it may be true that some writing about evolutionary psychology (particularly in the popular press) deserves rationalist scrutiny, certain forms of opposition to evolutionary psychology also deserve rationalist scrutiny for their long track record of putting badly-though-through social values above scientific inquiry.
So much junk opposing evolutionary psychology has been written that anyone casually investigating the subject can easily have screwed up priors and be infected with biases and misconceptions about the field. The best way to evaluate evolutionary psychology is to read what people in the field write in peer-reviewed publications (not popular books) and assess their reasoning for yourself.
Could you explain why you hypothesize that opposition to evolutionary psychology stems from the youth of the discipline? Or better yet, don’t try to explain your own thought processes and instead try reading what the critics write and assessing their arguments rather than imagining their motivations.
Yes, much of the opposition to sociobiology was based on political ideology. That has mostly passed. But the opposition to evolutionary psychology is based on epistemology. It just is not a respectable empirical science.
Could you explain why you hypothesize that opposition to evolutionary psychology stems from the youth of the discipline?
That was knb’s hypothesis, not mine.
Or better yet, don’t try to explain your own thought processes and instead try reading what the critics write and assessing their arguments rather than imagining their motivations.
Or even better, don’t accuse me of imagining people’s motivations when I’ve already given a citation about the politics around sociobiology and evolutionary psychology that informs my view: Defenders of theTruth by Ullica Segerstrale.
I have read plenty of criticism of evolutionary psychology. I’ve also read plenty of defenses of evolutionary psychology.
Yes, much of the opposition to sociobiology was based on political ideology. That has mostly passed.
On the contrary, I’ve seen plenty of opposition to evolutionary psychology from certain political ideologies. I’m not “imagining” these motivation. Are you not familiar with the opposition, or do you not think it comprises the bulk of opposition to evolutionary psychology?
But the opposition to evolutionary psychology is based on epistemology. It just is not a respectable empirical science.
Now we are talking. What sources have led you to this conclusion? If it’s Gould, Lewontin, Rose, etc… I think you’ve been snookered, and I’ll explain why when I respond to your other post where you brought them up.
My knowledge of evolutionary psychology comes mainly from the following sources:
Reading articles critical evolutionary psychology found on the web, or in journals.
Reading the introductions in studies from an evolutionary psychology perspective, that explain their methodology.
Reading responses to critics from evolutionary psychologists.
My preliminary impression is that evolutionary psychology is not categorically a failure at by being a respectable empirical science. This doesn’t mean that evolutionary psychologists are right about everything, or that I’m willing to defend every aspect of their reasoning. My impression is just that the epistemic standards in the peer-reviewed evolutionary psychology work I’m familiar with don’t seem obviously worse than the epistemic standards in mainstream sociology or psychology.
Could you explain why you hypothesize that opposition to evolutionary psychology stems from the youth of the discipline?
That was knb’s hypothesis, not mine.
Whoops, sorry. Now I feel like an idiot for reasons beyond squandering all my karma on this crusade.
I’ve read Segerstrale. I agree that the opposition to Sociobiology was unjustified. But I still claim that what Buller calls “EP” (as opposed to “ep”) is pseudo-science—not because it tells us something unwelcome about ourselves, but rather because it tells us next to nothing about ourselves.
My impression is just that the epistemic standards in the peer-reviewed evolutionary psychology work I’m familiar with don’t seem obviously worse than the epistemic standards in mainstream sociology or psychology.
Ah! That may explain our disagreement. I don’t know what standards are expected in sociology or psychology. I was thinking in terms of the standards expected in evolutionary biology. I thought I stated that in my initial comment.
But I still claim that what Buller calls “EP” (as opposed to “ep”) is pseudo-science—not because it tells us something unwelcome about ourselves, but rather because it tells us next to nothing about ourselves.
Compounding the problem is the false distinction Buller draws between “Evolutionary
Psychologists” and “evolutionary psychologists.” Buller is a self-proclaimed champion of “evolutionary psychology” and all of his critiques are aimed squarely at “Evolutionary
Psychology.” (It’s noteworthy that evolutionary researchers far-flung from his narrow
“Evolutionary Psychology” also hypothesize that men evolved to prefer attractiveness and women status in mates.) He often criticizes “Evolutionary Psychologists” by using theories and data generated by “evolutionary psychologists.” Yet many of these supposed “alternatives” are already widely accepted by “Evolutionary Psychologists.” But enough with the scare quotes. All of these researchers are part of a large, sprawling, heterogeneous scientific community that includes psychologists, anthropologists, biologists, and others. Like many scientific communities, evolutionary psychology includes a large set of shared assumptions and conclusions, and a healthy number of scientific disputes. Many—if not all—of the alternatives that Buller cites fall into the shared assumptions category.
‘EP’ versus ‘ep’. Our strongest critique concerns Buller’s very strategy.
Because Buller believes that ‘ep’ and ‘EP’ can be neatly distinguished, he
takes his arguments to undermine only EP, while leaving an evolutionary
approach to mind and behavior (ep) largely intact. The trouble is that
‘EP’ and ‘ep’ do not in fact represent independent, isolated groups of
people or schools of thought. Not only do evolutionary psychologists of
all stripes share common professional meetings and publication outlets,
they share a large number of theoretical commitments as well. As we will
explain in more detail below, some of these commitments, which Buller
dismisses as part of ‘EP’, are in fact likely to be crucial for any evolutionary science of the mind. In particular, Buller claims that information-processing mechanisms (or, more specifically, “cortical” mechanisms)
“weren’t shaped by selection over our species’ evolutionary history” (200),
and that “there is no such thing as human nature” (457). But this is
tantamount to rejecting two ideas—the existence of psychological adaptations and the notion of human nature—that are endorsed by evolutionary psychologists of all stripes. To give only one example, researchers
influenced by Boyd and Richerson’s theory of culture (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 2004) take a tendency to imitate prestigious people, sometimes called “prestige-dependent bias,” to be a psychological adaptation (Henrich and Gil-White 2001). While these
researchers would not be classified as ‘EP’ under Buller’s scheme, their
commitments to psychological adaptations and a human nature are just
as much a part of their research enterprise.
What do I think? I think these are rhetorically effective critical reviews. Without reading Buller’s book or any of the reviews by biologists and philosophers of biology, I have no idea whether they are fair reviews.
However, I have read enough by Cosmides, Tooby, and by their critics and defenders to form the opinion that what the critics say about their work is entirely fair.
Wow, who downvoted this, and why?
Not just that; certain political positions believe (correctly or incorrectly) that sociobiology or evolutionary psychology is counter to their worldviews. See Defenders of theTruth by Ullica Segerstrale.
While it may be true that some writing about evolutionary psychology (particularly in the popular press) deserves rationalist scrutiny, certain forms of opposition to evolutionary psychology also deserve rationalist scrutiny for their long track record of putting badly-though-through social values above scientific inquiry.
So much junk opposing evolutionary psychology has been written that anyone casually investigating the subject can easily have screwed up priors and be infected with biases and misconceptions about the field. The best way to evaluate evolutionary psychology is to read what people in the field write in peer-reviewed publications (not popular books) and assess their reasoning for yourself.
Could you explain why you hypothesize that opposition to evolutionary psychology stems from the youth of the discipline? Or better yet, don’t try to explain your own thought processes and instead try reading what the critics write and assessing their arguments rather than imagining their motivations.
Yes, much of the opposition to sociobiology was based on political ideology. That has mostly passed. But the opposition to evolutionary psychology is based on epistemology. It just is not a respectable empirical science.
That was knb’s hypothesis, not mine.
Or even better, don’t accuse me of imagining people’s motivations when I’ve already given a citation about the politics around sociobiology and evolutionary psychology that informs my view: Defenders of theTruth by Ullica Segerstrale.
I have read plenty of criticism of evolutionary psychology. I’ve also read plenty of defenses of evolutionary psychology.
On the contrary, I’ve seen plenty of opposition to evolutionary psychology from certain political ideologies. I’m not “imagining” these motivation. Are you not familiar with the opposition, or do you not think it comprises the bulk of opposition to evolutionary psychology?
Now we are talking. What sources have led you to this conclusion? If it’s Gould, Lewontin, Rose, etc… I think you’ve been snookered, and I’ll explain why when I respond to your other post where you brought them up.
My knowledge of evolutionary psychology comes mainly from the following sources:
Reading articles critical evolutionary psychology found on the web, or in journals.
Reading the introductions in studies from an evolutionary psychology perspective, that explain their methodology.
Reading responses to critics from evolutionary psychologists.
My preliminary impression is that evolutionary psychology is not categorically a failure at by being a respectable empirical science. This doesn’t mean that evolutionary psychologists are right about everything, or that I’m willing to defend every aspect of their reasoning. My impression is just that the epistemic standards in the peer-reviewed evolutionary psychology work I’m familiar with don’t seem obviously worse than the epistemic standards in mainstream sociology or psychology.
Whoops, sorry. Now I feel like an idiot for reasons beyond squandering all my karma on this crusade.
I’ve read Segerstrale. I agree that the opposition to Sociobiology was unjustified. But I still claim that what Buller calls “EP” (as opposed to “ep”) is pseudo-science—not because it tells us something unwelcome about ourselves, but rather because it tells us next to nothing about ourselves.
Ah! That may explain our disagreement. I don’t know what standards are expected in sociology or psychology. I was thinking in terms of the standards expected in evolutionary biology. I thought I stated that in my initial comment.
See what you think of Delton, Robertson, and Kenrick’s discussion of “Evolutionary Psychology” vs. evolutionary psychology:
See also Machery and Barrett’s response:
What do I think? I think these are rhetorically effective critical reviews. Without reading Buller’s book or any of the reviews by biologists and philosophers of biology, I have no idea whether they are fair reviews.
However, I have read enough by Cosmides, Tooby, and by their critics and defenders to form the opinion that what the critics say about their work is entirely fair.