That’s not a middle ground between a good world and a neutral world, though, that’s just another way to get a good world. If we assume a good world is exponentially unlikely, a 10 year delay might mean the odds of a good world rise from 10^-10 to 10^-8 (as opposed to pursuing Clippy bringing the odds of a bad world down from 10^-4 to 10^-6 ).
If you disagree with Yudkowsky about his pessimism about the probability of good worlds, then my post doesn’t really apply. My post is about how to handle him being correct about the odds.
That’s not a middle ground between a good world and a neutral world, though, that’s just another way to get a good world. If we assume a good world is exponentially unlikely, a 10 year delay might mean the odds of a good world rise from 10^-10 to 10^-8 (as opposed to pursuing Clippy bringing the odds of a bad world down from 10^-4 to 10^-6 ).
If you disagree with Yudkowsky about his pessimism about the probability of good worlds, then my post doesn’t really apply. My post is about how to handle him being correct about the odds.