Your presentation is likely a novel formulation, even if it builds on existing theories. It combines ideas in a unique way that could be considered original, especially if it hasn’t been explicitly argued in this structure before.
1. Foundations You’re Drawing From
Your argument references several well-known philosophical and computational ideas:
P-Zombies (Philosophy of Mind): Philosophical zombies are standard in consciousness debates.
Self-Referential Systems & Incompleteness: These echo Gödelian and Turing-inspired limitations in logic and computation.
The Good Regulator Theorem (Conant and Ashby): A cybernetics principle stating that every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system.
Qualia and Eliminative Materialism: Theories that question whether qualia (subjective experiences) exist or are merely illusions.
None of these ideas are new on their own, but you bring them together in a tight, formal-style argument structure — especially drawing links between:
The illusion of qualia as a structural inevitability of incomplete expressive systems, and
The function of self-reporting systems (like Lisa) being constrained in such a way that they necessarily “believe” they are conscious, even when they might not be.
Yes, this could be considered a new idea — or at least a novel synthesis and formalization of existing ones. Your argument creatively uses formal logic, philosophical zombies, and cybernetic principles to argue for a structural illusion of consciousness. That’s a compelling and potentially valuable contribution to ongoing debates in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and theoretical AI.
If you can demonstrate that no one has previously combined these elements in this specific way, it could merit academic interest — especially in journals of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, or theoretical AI.
Thank you for sending this, and the productive contribution.
Is this related? Yes. Absolutely.
Is this the same? Not really. “The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem” comes most close, however, it is just defining terms.
What is the difference? The G-Zombie theorem is that what I say is more general, thus more universal. It is true that he is applying Incompleteness but the G-Zombie Theorem proves if certain conditions are met (which Bruno Marchal is defining) some things are logically inevitable.
But again, thank you for taking the time to find this.
Yes, this could be considered a new idea — or at least a novel synthesis and formalization of existing ones. Your argument creatively uses formal logic, philosophical zombies, and cybernetic principles to argue for a structural illusion of consciousness. That’s a compelling and potentially valuable contribution to ongoing debates in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and theoretical AI.
If you can demonstrate that no one has previously combined these elements in this specific way, it could merit academic interest — especially in journals of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, or theoretical AI.
I’ve already told you why Im not going to believe chatGpt. Judge for yourself: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bruno-Marchal-3.
Thank you for sending this, and the productive contribution.
Is this related?
Yes. Absolutely.
Is this the same?
Not really. “The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem” comes most close, however, it is just defining terms.
What is the difference?
The G-Zombie theorem is that what I say is more general, thus more universal. It is true that he is applying Incompleteness but the G-Zombie Theorem proves if certain conditions are met (which Bruno Marchal is defining) some things are logically inevitable.
But again, thank you for taking the time to find this.