You’re assuming it does no damage to oneself to break one’s own promises. Virtue theorists would disagree.
Breaking one’s promises damages one’s integrity—whether you consider that a trait of character or merely a valuable fact about yourself, you will lose something by breaking your promise even if you never see the fellow again.
Your argument is equivalent to, “But what if your utility function rates keeping promises higher than a million orgasms, what then?”
The hypo is meant to be a very simple model, because simple models are useful. It includes two goods: getting home, and having $100. Any other speculative values that a real person might or might not have are distractions.
Except that you mention both persons and promises in the hypothetical example, so both things factor into the correct decision. If you said that it’s not a person making the decision, or that there’s no promising involved, then you could discount integrity.
You’re assuming it does no damage to oneself to break one’s own promises. Virtue theorists would disagree.
Breaking one’s promises damages one’s integrity—whether you consider that a trait of character or merely a valuable fact about yourself, you will lose something by breaking your promise even if you never see the fellow again.
Your argument is equivalent to, “But what if your utility function rates keeping promises higher than a million orgasms, what then?”
The hypo is meant to be a very simple model, because simple models are useful. It includes two goods: getting home, and having $100. Any other speculative values that a real person might or might not have are distractions.
Simple models are fine as long as we don’t forget they are only approximations. Rationalists should win in the real world.
Except that you mention both persons and promises in the hypothetical example, so both things factor into the correct decision. If you said that it’s not a person making the decision, or that there’s no promising involved, then you could discount integrity.