James, when you say, “be rational”, I think this shows a misunderstanding.
It may be really important to impress people with a certain kind of reckless courage. Then it is Rational to play chicken as bravely as you can. This Wins in the sense of being better than the alternative open to you.
Normally, I do not want to take the risk of being knocked down by a car. Only in this case is it not rational to play chicken: because not playing achieves what I want.
I do not see why a rationalist should be less courageous, less able to estimate distances and speeds, and so less likely to win at Chicken.
No. The point is that you actually want to survive more than you want to win, so if you are rational about Chicken you will sometimes lose (consult your model for details). Given your preferences, there will always be some distance \epsilon before the cliff where it is rational for you to give up.
Therefore, under these assumptions, the strategy “win or die trying” seemingly requires you to be irrational. However, if you can credibly commit to this strategy—be the kind of person who will win or die trying—you will beat a rational player every time.
This is a case where it is rational to have an irrational disposition, a disposition other than doing what is rational at every margin.
Agreed. In fact, the classic game-theoretic model of chicken requires that the players vastly prefer losing their pride to losing their lives. If winning/losing > losing/dying, then in a situation with imperfect information, we would assign a positive probability to playing aggressively.
And technically speaking, it is most rational, in the game-theoretic sense, to disable your steering ostentatiously before the other player does so as well. In that case, you’ve won the game before it begins, and there is no actual risk.
Either a) your opponent truly does believe that you’ve disabled your steering, in which case the outcomes are identical and the actions are equally rational, or b) we account for the (small?) chance that your opponent can determine that you actually have not disabled your steering, in which case he ostentatiously disables his and wins. Only by setting up what is in effect a doomsday device can you ensure that he will not be tempted to information-gathering brinksmanship.
James, when you say, “be rational”, I think this shows a misunderstanding.
It may be really important to impress people with a certain kind of reckless courage. Then it is Rational to play chicken as bravely as you can. This Wins in the sense of being better than the alternative open to you.
Normally, I do not want to take the risk of being knocked down by a car. Only in this case is it not rational to play chicken: because not playing achieves what I want.
I do not see why a rationalist should be less courageous, less able to estimate distances and speeds, and so less likely to win at Chicken.
No. The point is that you actually want to survive more than you want to win, so if you are rational about Chicken you will sometimes lose (consult your model for details). Given your preferences, there will always be some distance \epsilon before the cliff where it is rational for you to give up.
Therefore, under these assumptions, the strategy “win or die trying” seemingly requires you to be irrational. However, if you can credibly commit to this strategy—be the kind of person who will win or die trying—you will beat a rational player every time.
This is a case where it is rational to have an irrational disposition, a disposition other than doing what is rational at every margin.
But a person who truly cares more about winning than surviving can be utterly rational in choosing that strategy.
In chicken-like games in which one player is rational and the other irrational:
The rational person cares more about surviving than winning and so survives and loses.
The irrational person who doesn’t think through the consequences of losing both survives and wins.
Agreed. In fact, the classic game-theoretic model of chicken requires that the players vastly prefer losing their pride to losing their lives. If winning/losing > losing/dying, then in a situation with imperfect information, we would assign a positive probability to playing aggressively.
And technically speaking, it is most rational, in the game-theoretic sense, to disable your steering ostentatiously before the other player does so as well. In that case, you’ve won the game before it begins, and there is no actual risk.
No, if you are rational the best action is to convince your opponent that you have disabled your steering when in fact you have not done so.
Either a) your opponent truly does believe that you’ve disabled your steering, in which case the outcomes are identical and the actions are equally rational, or b) we account for the (small?) chance that your opponent can determine that you actually have not disabled your steering, in which case he ostentatiously disables his and wins. Only by setting up what is in effect a doomsday device can you ensure that he will not be tempted to information-gathering brinksmanship.