But you’ve generalised your position on perspective beyond conscious beings. My understanding is that perspective is not reducible to non-perspective facts in the theory because the perspective is contingent, but nothing there explicitly refers to consciousness.
You can adopt mutatus mutandis a different perspective in the description of a problem and arrive to the right conclusion. There’s no appeal to a phenomenal perspective there.
The epistemic limitations of minds that map to the idea of a perspective-centric epistemology and metaphysics come from facts about brains.
I didn’t “choose” to generalize my position beyond conscious beings. It is an integral part of it. If perspectives are valid only for things that are conscious (however that is defined), then perspective has some prerequisite and is no longer fundamental. It would also give rise to the age-old reference class problem and no longer be a solution to anthropic paradoxes. E.g. are computer simulations conscious? answers to that would directly determine anthropic problems such as Nick Bostrom’s simulation argument.
Phenomenal consciousness is integral to perspective also in the sense that you know your perspective, i.e. which is the self, precisely because the subjective experience is most immediate to it. So when a subject wakes up in the fission experiment, they know which person “I” refers to even though he cannot point that person out on a map.
My argument is in direct conflict with physicalism. And it places phenomenal consciousness and subjective experience outside the field of physics.
But you’ve generalised your position on perspective beyond conscious beings. My understanding is that perspective is not reducible to non-perspective facts in the theory because the perspective is contingent, but nothing there explicitly refers to consciousness.
You can adopt mutatus mutandis a different perspective in the description of a problem and arrive to the right conclusion. There’s no appeal to a phenomenal perspective there.
The epistemic limitations of minds that map to the idea of a perspective-centric epistemology and metaphysics come from facts about brains.
I didn’t “choose” to generalize my position beyond conscious beings. It is an integral part of it. If perspectives are valid only for things that are conscious (however that is defined), then perspective has some prerequisite and is no longer fundamental. It would also give rise to the age-old reference class problem and no longer be a solution to anthropic paradoxes. E.g. are computer simulations conscious? answers to that would directly determine anthropic problems such as Nick Bostrom’s simulation argument.
Phenomenal consciousness is integral to perspective also in the sense that you know your perspective, i.e. which is the self, precisely because the subjective experience is most immediate to it. So when a subject wakes up in the fission experiment, they know which person “I” refers to even though he cannot point that person out on a map.
My argument is in direct conflict with physicalism. And it places phenomenal consciousness and subjective experience outside the field of physics.