Who said that CToT motivates mathematical Platonism, or who said that CToT is the outstanding theory of mathemtaical truth?
Actual formal systems run on a coherence theory of truth: if the theory is consistent (and I do mean consistent according to a meta-system, so Goedel and Loeb aren’t involved right now), then it’s a theory. It may also be a totally uninteresting theory, or a very interesting theory. The truth-maker for a mathematical statement is just whether it has a model (and if you really wanted to, you could probably compile that into something about computation via the Curry-Howard Correspondence and some amount of Turing oracles). But the mere truth of a statement within a formal system is not the interesting thing about the statement!
I couldn’t agree more that coherence is the best description of mathematical practice.
Who said that CToT motivates mathematical Platonism, or who said that CToT is the outstanding theory of mathemtaical truth?
I couldn’t agree more that coherence is the best description of mathematical practice.
This one.
Or rather, who claimed that the truth-makers of mathematical statements are physical facts?