Pretend you are under the impression that you care more about X than Y. You are also under the impression that you have never faced a trade-off between X and Y. I believe you have a bias view of your own preferences. I prove this by presenting a hypothetical situation in which you recognize you would be much more bothered by losing 1 Y than 50,000 X. I have thus showed that your initial views about X and Y are bias. The bias revealed, you now realize that you do value Y a lot more than X.
If I have a conflict between my emotional reactions and my explicit believed preference I can resolve that disagreement any way I please. Emotions do not need to dominate. For example a particularly strong desire for Joe to be dead doesn’t mean I actually have to decide that I want him dead.
But for the analogy to work: (a) you were under the impression that you loved Joe, (b) you in fact hated Joe, (c) your actions were consistent with (b), and (d) the hypothetical choice convinced you of (b).
But for the analogy to work: (a) you were under the impression that you loved Joe, (b) you in fact hated Joe, (c) your actions were consistent with (b), and (d) the hypothetical choice convinced you of (b).
That just isn’t true. In fact it doesn’t seem to me like a single one of those premises is necessary.
Your emotions reveal what you really care about.
Pretend you are under the impression that you care more about X than Y. You are also under the impression that you have never faced a trade-off between X and Y. I believe you have a bias view of your own preferences. I prove this by presenting a hypothetical situation in which you recognize you would be much more bothered by losing 1 Y than 50,000 X. I have thus showed that your initial views about X and Y are bias. The bias revealed, you now realize that you do value Y a lot more than X.
If I have a conflict between my emotional reactions and my explicit believed preference I can resolve that disagreement any way I please. Emotions do not need to dominate. For example a particularly strong desire for Joe to be dead doesn’t mean I actually have to decide that I want him dead.
But for the analogy to work: (a) you were under the impression that you loved Joe, (b) you in fact hated Joe, (c) your actions were consistent with (b), and (d) the hypothetical choice convinced you of (b).
That just isn’t true. In fact it doesn’t seem to me like a single one of those premises is necessary.
Nick’s point just seems blatantly obvious to me.