Lest you think this a trivial ability, remember how rare it is in the animal kingdom.
I disagree with the notion that the ability to distinguish the map and the territory separates humans from other animals. Consider this: I am nearsighted. When I look a sign from far away, I can’t make out the letters. However, when I look at a human from a similar distance, I can recognize the face. Clearly my facial recognition system has adaptions for working with nearsighted eyes. A lens that can see its own flaws. And this couldn’t have evolved only in humans. Mice probably have similar adaptions.
And think about this optical illusion: Nearby objects look bigger than distant objects. Yet we don’t think this as an illusion at all, because we are so good at adjusting to it.
What about this: we have mechanisms to make proteins based on DNA sequences, but do we have any mechanisms for telling weather we have the right DNA sequence? Yes we do. Nearly every organism has error-correcting processes right after replication (where errors are most likely to be created), and many ways to avoid getting viruses to fool them.
In none of these cases does the organism make a theory about how their lens is flawed, and then correct themselves based on the theory. But here the difference is not in seeing flaws, but in that humans make theories to a much higher amount of sophistication than other animals.
When I look a sign from far away, I can’t make out the letters. However, when I look at a human from a similar distance, I can recognize the face. Clearly my facial recognition system has adaptions for working with nearsighted eyes. A lens that can see its own flaws. And this couldn’t have evolved only in humans. Mice probably have similar adaptions.
[...]
What about this: we have mechanisms to make proteins based on DNA sequences, but do we have any mechanisms for telling weather we have the right DNA sequence? Yes we do. Nearly every organism has error-correcting processes right after replication (where errors are most likely to be created), and many ways to avoid getting viruses to fool them.
The DNA replication mechanism relies on proofreading each segment right after it has been appended to the new copy. If the newly added segment differs from the base, it would be corrected, before the process moves to the next segment. It’s a hard-coded biological mechanism, occurring locally within a cell. [1]
What’s uniquely human in this argument is the ability to apply a corrective mechanism on the logical—or epistemological—level. The mechanism itself must be grounded in physical processes happening within our bodies and extends to the realm of thoughts. Humans, through evolving culture, found out that there is an innate bias, and then realized that we can make better predictions about the world if we compensate for it. That’s what (I think) Eliezer meant by applying second-order corrective error to the first-order thoughts. The models of our physiology and mental processes produce an estimation of that error—the more accurate the model, the better the estimation of the corrective error, and finally, the more objective view of reality. The corrective mechanisms on the cellular- or tissue- or organ-level are present across the whole animal kingdom. In fact, they are the basis of life, but they are not what this article is about.
Setting this distinction aside, do we actually have any evidence of thinking about thinking being a uniquely human ability? Without doing the heavy lifting of investigating the corpus of data, I’d imagine this ability lives on a spectrum with some of the other species showing at least a minimal degree of self-reflection. My intuition is that a second-order correction wouldn’t be possible without linguistic and symbolic capabilities, and traces of these are also present in other animals—like dolphins.
I think you have a point, but I’m not sure about your examples:
Clearly my facial recognition system has adaptions for working with nearsighted eyes. A lens that can see its own flaws.
The facial recognition system is working with poor information from the eye, but it is not a part of it; it cannot correct for flaws in itself.
And think about this optical illusion: Nearby objects look bigger than distant objects. Yet we don’t think this as an illusion at all, because we are so good at adjusting to it.
We evolved to do so. There is error correction, yes, but it is fixed; when this misleads us it does not fix itself. (Or does it? Our sensory systems are absurdly adaptable, I wouldn’t be surprised. If so, that would be a good example.)
And think about this optical illusion: Nearby objects look bigger than distant objects. Yet we don’t think this as an illusion at all, because we are so good at adjusting to it.
Ayn Randians extend that to everything. According to them,the bent stick illusion isn’t an illusion because sticks are supposed to look bent in water.
I disagree with the notion that the ability to distinguish the map and the territory separates humans from other animals. Consider this: I am nearsighted. When I look a sign from far away, I can’t make out the letters. However, when I look at a human from a similar distance, I can recognize the face. Clearly my facial recognition system has adaptions for working with nearsighted eyes. A lens that can see its own flaws. And this couldn’t have evolved only in humans. Mice probably have similar adaptions.
And think about this optical illusion: Nearby objects look bigger than distant objects. Yet we don’t think this as an illusion at all, because we are so good at adjusting to it.
What about this: we have mechanisms to make proteins based on DNA sequences, but do we have any mechanisms for telling weather we have the right DNA sequence? Yes we do. Nearly every organism has error-correcting processes right after replication (where errors are most likely to be created), and many ways to avoid getting viruses to fool them.
In none of these cases does the organism make a theory about how their lens is flawed, and then correct themselves based on the theory. But here the difference is not in seeing flaws, but in that humans make theories to a much higher amount of sophistication than other animals.
The DNA replication mechanism relies on proofreading each segment right after it has been appended to the new copy. If the newly added segment differs from the base, it would be corrected, before the process moves to the next segment. It’s a hard-coded biological mechanism, occurring locally within a cell. [1]
What’s uniquely human in this argument is the ability to apply a corrective mechanism on the logical—or epistemological—level. The mechanism itself must be grounded in physical processes happening within our bodies and extends to the realm of thoughts. Humans, through evolving culture, found out that there is an innate bias, and then realized that we can make better predictions about the world if we compensate for it. That’s what (I think) Eliezer meant by applying second-order corrective error to the first-order thoughts. The models of our physiology and mental processes produce an estimation of that error—the more accurate the model, the better the estimation of the corrective error, and finally, the more objective view of reality. The corrective mechanisms on the cellular- or tissue- or organ-level are present across the whole animal kingdom. In fact, they are the basis of life, but they are not what this article is about.
Setting this distinction aside, do we actually have any evidence of thinking about thinking being a uniquely human ability? Without doing the heavy lifting of investigating the corpus of data, I’d imagine this ability lives on a spectrum with some of the other species showing at least a minimal degree of self-reflection. My intuition is that a second-order correction wouldn’t be possible without linguistic and symbolic capabilities, and traces of these are also present in other animals—like dolphins.
[1] - https://bio.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Introductory_and_General_Biology/Map%3A_Raven_Biology_12th_Edition/14%3A_DNA-_The_Genetic_Material/14.06%3A_DNA_Repair
I think you have a point, but I’m not sure about your examples:
The facial recognition system is working with poor information from the eye, but it is not a part of it; it cannot correct for flaws in itself.
We evolved to do so. There is error correction, yes, but it is fixed; when this misleads us it does not fix itself. (Or does it? Our sensory systems are absurdly adaptable, I wouldn’t be surprised. If so, that would be a good example.)
Ayn Randians extend that to everything. According to them,the bent stick illusion isn’t an illusion because sticks are supposed to look bent in water.
Can you taboo “supposed” there?
(Also, I think they’re called “Objectivists”)
Not everyone gets the big-O small-o distinction.
It’s not really my theory, but O-ists define “illiusion” in such a way that only miraculius exceptions to the laws of nature could be iillusions.