I miss the discussion (on LW in general) of an approach to ethics that strives to determine what actions should be unlawful for an agent, as opposed to, say, what probability distribution over actions is optimal for an agent. (And I don’t mean “deontologic”, as the “unlawfulness” can be predicated on the consequences.) If you criticize this comment for confusion of “descriptive ethics vs. normative ethics vs. metaethics”, try to be constructive.
I don’t criticize your comment on the basis of any confusion. It appears be more or less a coherent indication of preference. I criticize it based on considering the state which you desire to be both abhorrent and not (sufficiently) lacking here.
I don’t criticize your comment on the basis of any confusion. It appears be more or less a coherent indication of preference. I criticize it based on considering the state which you desire to be both abhorrent and not (sufficiently) lacking here.
Do you find the “classification problem” variant of the “optimization problem” already repugnant, or is it something deeper?
Classification vs optimization is not necessarily a feature I was commenting on.
The degree of bullshit that is intrinsic to such conversations when engaged in by human participants may be a contributing factor.