If someone makes a claim of the ‘ought’ type, either they are talking about the world of is, or they are talking about the world of is not. If they are talking about the world of is not, then I quickly lose interest because the world of is not isn’t my subject of interest.
Ironically, this is where I quickly lost interest in this article, because glib word-play isn’t my subject of interest.
I wasn’t trying to be glib. All I’m saying is that if somebody uses ‘ought’ terms to refer to things that can’t be reduced to physics, then they’re either talking about things that don’t exist or they aren’t physicalists—and physicalism vs. non-physicalism is beyond the scope of this particular article.
… if somebody uses ‘ought’ terms to refer to things that can’t be reduced to physics …
Your emphasis on can’t. But do you really mean “can’t be reduced”? Or are you rather excluding anything that “hasn’t been reduced”? In the original posting you seem to be demanding that anyone using “ought language” be prepared to perform the reduction on the spot:
If they are making a claim about the world of is, then I ask them which part of the world of is they are discussing. I ask which ought-reductionism they have in mind.
I’m sorry, Luke. My commitment to reductionism is more of a vague hope for future physicalist explanation. I did not agree to use only that language which I can simultaneously show to be universally tabooable.
I feel you’re being uncharitable. Do you really think we’re having a disagreement about how reductionism works? I’m not demanding that somebody have a full down-to-atoms reduction in mind whenever they use any term whatever. My target in that paragraph is people who themselves don’t think their use of ‘ought’ will ever reduce into physics—for example Richard Chappell.
I believe that you do feel that. But if you think that excluding people like Chappell from the discussion is a fruitful way to proceed, then I am curious why you believe that what you are discussing is properly termed “Meta-ethics”.
ETA: Ok, I’ll try for a bit more charity. Why does it matter whether a reduction of “ought” to physics can or cannot be accomplished? Why not simply present your ideas and then point out that they have the virtue of making ‘ought’ reducible?
It seems to me that you are trying too hard to be a good follower of Eliezer. Take my word for it; that isn’t necessary to be respected in this forum. It is possible (though admittedly sometimes expensive) to communicate without first achieving some kind of metaphysical solid ground.
I didn’t spend more time on reductionism because that is covered in the reductionism sequence. This post is already too long; I don’t have the space to re-hash all the arguments for reductionism. Chappell already knows what’s in the reductionism sequence, and why he disagrees with it, and that is a different discussion.
“World of is” vs “World of is not” is a false dichotomy.
“I lose interest” is possibly the worst and most uncharitable of all forms of philosophical rhetoric. (Hence my ‘turnabout’.)
Luke gave a false impression of what non-naturalistic ethics comprises by providing only a single example of such a position—a position which was absurd because it presumed the existence of a deity.
Even Hume allowed that works of mathematics need not be “committed to the flames”. Mathematics, to my mind, does not deal with the “world of is”, neither does it deal with the “world of is not”. Yet if someone were to provide a non-reductionist, but axiomatic, ‘definition’ of ‘good’ using the methods and practices of mathematical logic, I certainly would not dismiss it as “uninteresting”.
But mathematics does deal with the “world of is” either potentially or as “rules of thought” (all thoughts are in minds). God, on the other hand, is different.
In my mind, the practice of mathematics is the practice of distinguishing between the “world of is” and the “world of is not;” if something is mathematically provable, it is; if something is mathematically disprovable it is not.
In The Is_Ought Gap, Luke writes
Ironically, this is where I quickly lost interest in this article, because glib word-play isn’t my subject of interest.
I wasn’t trying to be glib. All I’m saying is that if somebody uses ‘ought’ terms to refer to things that can’t be reduced to physics, then they’re either talking about things that don’t exist or they aren’t physicalists—and physicalism vs. non-physicalism is beyond the scope of this particular article.
Can “the best way to play chess” be reduced to physics? Can it usefully be rduced to physics.
Your emphasis on can’t. But do you really mean “can’t be reduced”? Or are you rather excluding anything that “hasn’t been reduced”? In the original posting you seem to be demanding that anyone using “ought language” be prepared to perform the reduction on the spot:
I’m sorry, Luke. My commitment to reductionism is more of a vague hope for future physicalist explanation. I did not agree to use only that language which I can simultaneously show to be universally tabooable.
Perplexed,
I feel you’re being uncharitable. Do you really think we’re having a disagreement about how reductionism works? I’m not demanding that somebody have a full down-to-atoms reduction in mind whenever they use any term whatever. My target in that paragraph is people who themselves don’t think their use of ‘ought’ will ever reduce into physics—for example Richard Chappell.
I believe that you do feel that. But if you think that excluding people like Chappell from the discussion is a fruitful way to proceed, then I am curious why you believe that what you are discussing is properly termed “Meta-ethics”.
ETA: Ok, I’ll try for a bit more charity. Why does it matter whether a reduction of “ought” to physics can or cannot be accomplished? Why not simply present your ideas and then point out that they have the virtue of making ‘ought’ reducible?
It seems to me that you are trying too hard to be a good follower of Eliezer. Take my word for it; that isn’t necessary to be respected in this forum. It is possible (though admittedly sometimes expensive) to communicate without first achieving some kind of metaphysical solid ground.
I didn’t spend more time on reductionism because that is covered in the reductionism sequence. This post is already too long; I don’t have the space to re-hash all the arguments for reductionism. Chappell already knows what’s in the reductionism sequence, and why he disagrees with it, and that is a different discussion.
Luke’s position seems more reasonable here.
I have to say that the “following” around here is kinda irritating to me too.
There’s a scene from The Life of Brian that comes to mind—the “you’ve got to think for yourselves” scene.
Can you elaborate?
“World of is” vs “World of is not” is a false dichotomy.
“I lose interest” is possibly the worst and most uncharitable of all forms of philosophical rhetoric. (Hence my ‘turnabout’.)
Luke gave a false impression of what non-naturalistic ethics comprises by providing only a single example of such a position—a position which was absurd because it presumed the existence of a deity.
Even Hume allowed that works of mathematics need not be “committed to the flames”. Mathematics, to my mind, does not deal with the “world of is”, neither does it deal with the “world of is not”. Yet if someone were to provide a non-reductionist, but axiomatic, ‘definition’ of ‘good’ using the methods and practices of mathematical logic, I certainly would not dismiss it as “uninteresting”.
But mathematics does deal with the “world of is” either potentially or as “rules of thought” (all thoughts are in minds). God, on the other hand, is different.
In my mind, the practice of mathematics is the practice of distinguishing between the “world of is” and the “world of is not;” if something is mathematically provable, it is; if something is mathematically disprovable it is not.
Existence and non-existence pretty much exausts all possibilities here, no?