I don’t understand the terms “world of is” and “world of is not”. Does “talking about world of is not” mean “deducing from false assumptions”, or is there something more to it? Anyway, “talking about world of is” sounds like the worst kind of continental philosophy babble.
Else, the article is clear, comprehensible and well readable.
While “of is, of is not” didn’t hurt my understanding that much, the article would be better off without them.
I agree, and also note that the way luke dismisses the “is not” misses much of the point that is trying to be expressed by the phrase. If it is going to be discussed at all it deserves the same kind of parameterizing as ‘objective’ received.
It seems to be essentially a bit of wordplay, in that he uses it to mean two different things. Initially he is contrasting “is/is not” statements with “ought/ought not” statements. Later he talks about things that exist vs. things that don’t exist. It doesn’t seem to be very helpful though; in the earlier sense, there is no distinction between the “world of is” and the “world of is not”. So this seems like it was a bad idea.
I think there may be a good idea behind it though: view it as a cryptic appeal to Occam’s Razor. Various moralists (e.g., Railton, Craig) were shown to be speaking of real things and properties, or of imaginary ones, with their moral language. Why not then hypothesize that all are—albeit less transparently than these two—and do away with the need of a special metaphysics or semantics (or both) for “ought” questions as “opposed” to “is” questions.
I don’t understand the terms “world of is” and “world of is not”. Does “talking about world of is not” mean “deducing from false assumptions”, or is there something more to it? Anyway, “talking about world of is” sounds like the worst kind of continental philosophy babble.
Else, the article is clear, comprehensible and well readable.
While “of is, of is not” didn’t hurt my understanding that much, the article would be better off without them.
I agree, and also note that the way luke dismisses the “is not” misses much of the point that is trying to be expressed by the phrase. If it is going to be discussed at all it deserves the same kind of parameterizing as ‘objective’ received.
It seems to be essentially a bit of wordplay, in that he uses it to mean two different things. Initially he is contrasting “is/is not” statements with “ought/ought not” statements. Later he talks about things that exist vs. things that don’t exist. It doesn’t seem to be very helpful though; in the earlier sense, there is no distinction between the “world of is” and the “world of is not”. So this seems like it was a bad idea.
I think there may be a good idea behind it though: view it as a cryptic appeal to Occam’s Razor. Various moralists (e.g., Railton, Craig) were shown to be speaking of real things and properties, or of imaginary ones, with their moral language. Why not then hypothesize that all are—albeit less transparently than these two—and do away with the need of a special metaphysics or semantics (or both) for “ought” questions as “opposed” to “is” questions.
Does this make it any clearer?
Yes, it does.