But whatever our intended meaning of ‘ought’ is, the same reasoning applies. Either our intended meaning of ‘ought’ refers (eventually) to the world of maths and physics (in which case the is-ought gap is bridged), or else it doesn’t (in which case it fails to refer).12
The is-ought problem is an epistemic problem. Being informed that some A is ultimately, ontologically, the same as some B does not tell me how that A entails that B. If I cannot see how an “is” implies an “ought”, being informed that the “ought” ultimately refer to states of the world—states of the world far too complex for me to include in my epistemic calculations—does not help. I can’t cram a (representation of a) world-state into my brain. Being informed that if I could I would no longer have an is-ought problem under the unlikely circumstances that I could do so doesn’t help. The ontological claim that is’s and ought’s ultimately have the same referents can only
be justified by some epistemic procedure. That is the only way any ontological claim is justified.
That’s true. Which means you really should have brought this argument up and resolved it, instead of making this argument and then declaring the matter unresolved.
I didn’t declared anything unresolved. I have argued that PMR does not close the is-ought gap. AFAIC that stands
until someone counterargues. But hey, you could always downvote it out of visibiliy.
The is-ought problem is an epistemic problem. Being informed that some A is ultimately, ontologically, the same as some B does not tell me how that A entails that B. If I cannot see how an “is” implies an “ought”, being informed that the “ought” ultimately refer to states of the world—states of the world far too complex for me to include in my epistemic calculations—does not help. I can’t cram a (representation of a) world-state into my brain. Being informed that if I could I would no longer have an is-ought problem under the unlikely circumstances that I could do so doesn’t help. The ontological claim that is’s and ought’s ultimately have the same referents can only be justified by some epistemic procedure. That is the only way any ontological claim is justified.
You really shouldn’t be using your own comments as evidence in an argument. It makes your reasoning appear… just a little motivated.
An argument works or it doens″t.
That’s true. Which means you really should have brought this argument up and resolved it, instead of making this argument and then declaring the matter unresolved.
I didn’t declared anything unresolved. I have argued that PMR does not close the is-ought gap. AFAIC that stands until someone counterargues. But hey, you could always downvote it out of visibiliy.