In a sense, pluralistic moral reductionism can be considered a robust form of moral ‘realism’, in the same way that pluralistic sound reductionism is a robust form of sound realism. “Yes, there really is sound, and we can locate it in reality — either as vibrations or as mental auditory experiences
In a sense it can’t be considered robust realism. The two meanings of “sound” don’t lead to any confusion in practice: we know that powerful hi fis produce a lot of sound1 and we know
that deaf people standing in front of the won’t hear any sound2.
However, morality is tied to the actions of oneself and others. There’s no coherent
situation in which gay marriage can be both right and wrong, because there is no
coherent way it can be both allowed and forbidden. In practice we tend to just
average out preferences when it comes to defining law and allocating
resources...but the preferences in question might as well be subjective.
It is difficult to see what is being bought by the objectivity in pluralistic objective
reductionism.
But in another sense, pluralistic moral reductionism is ‘anti-realist’. It suggests that there is no One True Theory of Morality. (We use moral terms in a variety of ways, and some of those ways refer to different sets of natural facts.)
Of course normative pluralism doesn’t follow from descriptive pluralism. Some
uses of moral terms be wrong. You said Craigs theological morality was wrong. If reducing and naturalising morality doesn’t allow you to say anybody is right or wrong, what is the point?
And as a reductionist approach to morality, it might also leave no room for moral theories which say there are universally binding moral rules for which the universe (e.g. via a God) will hold us accountable.
Or, eg,, not via God. Unless there are: if you can say 1 theory is wrong, you can
say N-1 are wrong and arrive at one not-wrong theory by elimination. So I don’t
see how your approach supports pluralism as a fixed principle: it can only depend on how things pan out in practice.
There’s no coherent situation in which gay marriage can be both right and wrong
There’s also no coherent situation in which something can be sound and not sound.
You said Craigs theological morality was wrong.
Even worse than wrong (wrong here meaning wrong(Manfred) )! It follows from a probably false premise, and so is undefined when phrased as coming from God.
If reducing and naturalising morality doesn’t allow you to say anybody is right or wrong, what is the point?
If “unheard compression waves” counts as an instance in which something is “sound and not sound”, then gay marriage can equally be “right and wrong” if, e.g., it is prohibited by the Bible but isn’t any obstacle to maximizing net preference satisfaction.
No doubt you want to protest: No, but there really is a single absolute truth about what’s right and what’s wrong, whereas there really isn’t a single absolute truth about what counts as “sound”. Maybe so, but that’s a highly disputable matter and you might do well to offer some actual arguments.
If reducing and naturalising morality doesn’t allow you to say anybody is right or wrong, what is the point?
To convince people that it is ok for me to smack Urist McHatedRival in the face with a sharp rock and take all his stuff. And probably his daughters. The same as any other discussion about morality.
Are you telling me you are a Urist sympathiser and also practitioner of witchcraft? You ought not say such things. Come tribe, we should slay him too before the wrath of Odin falls upon us.
Moralizing is all about using hypocrisy effectively to achieve personal gains through social influence.
You haven’t argued that in any way. The point of my parable was that , while it may be easy to condemn other people’s uses of morality , it is much harder to do without when you feel vicitimised yourself.
The point of my parable was that , while it may be easy to condemn other people’s uses of morality , it is much harder to do without when you feel vicitimised yourself.
And your point would have be relevant if I was condemning the use of morality rather than describing them for the sake of giving a straight answer to a rhetorical question. Your ‘parable’ misses the mark. A “devil’s advocate” against a straw man, as it were.
Haven’t understood what? Please repeat whatever argument you believe I
have missed.
And your point would have be relevant if I was condemning the use of morality rather than describing them for the sake of giving a straight answer to a rhetorical question.
Your comments about reality read like a contentious claim to me. Retroactively calling
a contentious claim a “description” does nothing to remove the need for argumentative support.
Your comments about reality read like a contentious claim to me. Retroactively calling a contentious claim a “description” does nothing to remove the need for argumentative support.
This is still not making sense as a reply in the context. If you had expressed disagreement with a claim of mine then we could use arguments to try to persuade people about the subject. But if you present a refutation of something I didn’t say then it is an error for me to present arguments for whatever straw man you happened to to attack.
The following is the claim I do make:
One of the points of engaging in extensive debate about systems of morality is that while doing so you have the opportunity to influence the way your community thinks about how people should behave. This allows you to gain practical advantages for yourself and cause harm to your rivals.
I’m not going to provide an extended treatise on that subject here—it isn’t appropriate for the context. But if you do actually disagree with me then that gives you a clear position to argue against and I will leave you to do so without refutation.
One of the points of engaging in extensive debate about systems of morality is that while doing so you have the opportunity to influence the way your community thinks about how people should behave. This allows you to gain practical advantages for yourself and cause harm to your rivals.
I disagree your original claim that gaining advantage is the point of engaging
in moral debate. Your revised claim, that it is only one of the points, is uninteresting, since any tool can be misused.
In a sense it can’t be considered robust realism. The two meanings of “sound” don’t lead to any confusion in practice: we know that powerful hi fis produce a lot of sound1 and we know that deaf people standing in front of the won’t hear any sound2.
However, morality is tied to the actions of oneself and others. There’s no coherent situation in which gay marriage can be both right and wrong, because there is no coherent way it can be both allowed and forbidden. In practice we tend to just average out preferences when it comes to defining law and allocating resources...but the preferences in question might as well be subjective. It is difficult to see what is being bought by the objectivity in pluralistic objective reductionism.
Of course normative pluralism doesn’t follow from descriptive pluralism. Some uses of moral terms be wrong. You said Craigs theological morality was wrong. If reducing and naturalising morality doesn’t allow you to say anybody is right or wrong, what is the point?
Or, eg,, not via God. Unless there are: if you can say 1 theory is wrong, you can say N-1 are wrong and arrive at one not-wrong theory by elimination. So I don’t see how your approach supports pluralism as a fixed principle: it can only depend on how things pan out in practice.
There’s also no coherent situation in which something can be sound and not sound.
Even worse than wrong (wrong here meaning wrong(Manfred) )! It follows from a probably false premise, and so is undefined when phrased as coming from God.
Ending the arguments over this stuff.
Sure there is: unheard compression waves.
Should we end all arguments by giving up on any fact of the matter?
So then let’s do the same for the gay marriage example.
We should end all arguments about subjects where there is no fact of the matter.
I don’t think you can. The different meanings of “sound” are disambiguated by context
OK. Then we just need to have the argument about whether there is a fact of the matter. Oh,,,we are.
Not anymore!
If “unheard compression waves” counts as an instance in which something is “sound and not sound”, then gay marriage can equally be “right and wrong” if, e.g., it is prohibited by the Bible but isn’t any obstacle to maximizing net preference satisfaction.
No doubt you want to protest: No, but there really is a single absolute truth about what’s right and what’s wrong, whereas there really isn’t a single absolute truth about what counts as “sound”. Maybe so, but that’s a highly disputable matter and you might do well to offer some actual arguments.
To convince people that it is ok for me to smack Urist McHatedRival in the face with a sharp rock and take all his stuff. And probably his daughters. The same as any other discussion about morality.
Are you telling me you are a Urist sympathiser and also practitioner of witchcraft? You ought not say such things. Come tribe, we should slay him too before the wrath of Odin falls upon us.
Moralizing is all about using hypocrisy effectively to achieve personal gains through social influence.
You haven’t argued that in any way. The point of my parable was that , while it may be easy to condemn other people’s uses of morality , it is much harder to do without when you feel vicitimised yourself.
Or you simply haven’t understood.
And your point would have be relevant if I was condemning the use of morality rather than describing them for the sake of giving a straight answer to a rhetorical question. Your ‘parable’ misses the mark. A “devil’s advocate” against a straw man, as it were.
Haven’t understood what? Please repeat whatever argument you believe I have missed.
Your comments about reality read like a contentious claim to me. Retroactively calling a contentious claim a “description” does nothing to remove the need for argumentative support.
This is still not making sense as a reply in the context. If you had expressed disagreement with a claim of mine then we could use arguments to try to persuade people about the subject. But if you present a refutation of something I didn’t say then it is an error for me to present arguments for whatever straw man you happened to to attack.
The following is the claim I do make:
One of the points of engaging in extensive debate about systems of morality is that while doing so you have the opportunity to influence the way your community thinks about how people should behave. This allows you to gain practical advantages for yourself and cause harm to your rivals.
I’m not going to provide an extended treatise on that subject here—it isn’t appropriate for the context. But if you do actually disagree with me then that gives you a clear position to argue against and I will leave you to do so without refutation.
I disagree your original claim that gaining advantage is the point of engaging in moral debate. Your revised claim, that it is only one of the points, is uninteresting, since any tool can be misused.