The cited article is not available for free. Also, I’m more interested in the situation with the tickle defense rather than the metatickle defense, because assuming zero capacity for introspection seems like a silly thing to do when formulating a decision theory.
Then I don’t think I have anything to offer on that front.
Also, in regards to people claiming that two-boxing on Newcomb’s problem is an advantage for the tickle defense, that seems very strange. What’s the point in avoiding CDT if you’re going to trick yourself into two-boxing anyway?
That’s exactly the point EY is making: they’re taking their intuitions as supreme and finding out how they can fit the decision theory to the intuitions rather than looking at results and working backward to what decision theories get the good results.
Then I don’t think I have anything to offer on that front.
That’s exactly the point EY is making: they’re taking their intuitions as supreme and finding out how they can fit the decision theory to the intuitions rather than looking at results and working backward to what decision theories get the good results.