Incidentally, I think that if you pick “dust specks,” you’re asserting that you would walk away from Omelas; if you pick torture, you’re asserting that you wouldn’t.
The kind of person who chooses an individual suffering torture in order to spare a large enough number of other people lesser discomfort endorses Omelas. The kind of individual who doesn’t not only walks away from Omelas, but wants it not to exist at all.
This is exactly what bothered me about the story, actually. You can choose to help the child and possibly doom Omelas, or you can choose not to, for whatever reason. But walking away doesn’t solve the problem!
True. On reflection, it’s patently obvious that the Less Wrong way to deal with Omelas is not to accept that the child’s suffering is necessary to the city’s welfare, and dedicate oneself to finding the third alternative. “Some of them understand why,” so it’s obviously possible to know what the connection is between the child and the city; knowing that, one can seek some other way of providing whatever factor the tormented child provides. That does mean allowing the suffering to go on until you find the solution, though—if you free the child and ruin Omelas, it’s likely too late at that point to achieve the goal of saving both.
Well, it depends on the nature of the problem I’ve identified. If I endorse Omelas, but don’t wish to partake of it myself, walking away solves that problem. (I endorse lots of relationships I don’t want to participate in.)
Incidentally, I think that if you pick “dust specks,” you’re asserting that you would walk away from Omelas; if you pick torture, you’re asserting that you wouldn’t.
The kind of person who chooses an individual suffering torture in order to spare a large enough number of other people lesser discomfort endorses Omelas. The kind of individual who doesn’t not only walks away from Omelas, but wants it not to exist at all.
This is exactly what bothered me about the story, actually. You can choose to help the child and possibly doom Omelas, or you can choose not to, for whatever reason. But walking away doesn’t solve the problem!
True. On reflection, it’s patently obvious that the Less Wrong way to deal with Omelas is not to accept that the child’s suffering is necessary to the city’s welfare, and dedicate oneself to finding the third alternative. “Some of them understand why,” so it’s obviously possible to know what the connection is between the child and the city; knowing that, one can seek some other way of providing whatever factor the tormented child provides. That does mean allowing the suffering to go on until you find the solution, though—if you free the child and ruin Omelas, it’s likely too late at that point to achieve the goal of saving both.
Well, it depends on the nature of the problem I’ve identified. If I endorse Omelas, but don’t wish to partake of it myself, walking away solves that problem. (I endorse lots of relationships I don’t want to participate in.)
That’s not a moral objection, that’s a personal preference.
Yes, that’s true. It’s hard to have a moral objection to something I endorse.
It certainly doesn’t. However, it shows more moral perceptiveness than most people have.