I have not yet accepted that consistency is always the best course in every situation. For example, in Pascal’s Mugging, a random person threatens to take away a zillion units of utility if you don’t pay them $5. The probability they can make good on their threat is miniscule, but by multiplying out by the size of the threat, it still ought to motivate you to give the money. Some belief has to give—the belief that multiplication works, the belief that I shouldn’t pay the money, or the belief that I should be consistent all the time—and right now, consistency seems like the weakest link in the chain.
No, no, no!
There are an infinite number of possible Pascal’s muggings, but people only look at them one at a time. Why don’t you keep the $5 in case you need it for the next Pascal’s mugger who offers you 2^zillion units of utility? That is a much better bet if you only look at those two possible muggings.
The real problem is that utility functions, as we calculate them now, do not converge. This is a reason to be confused, not a reason to bite such ridiculous bullets.
There are an infinite number of possible Pascal’s muggings, but people only look at them one at a time. Why don’t you keep the $5 in case you need it for the next Pascal’s mugger who offers you 2^zillion units of utility?
(As you acknowledge, but with more emphasis) this is an excuse, not a real reason. You do not really care about having money primarily so that you can be prepared for the next pascal’s mugger. (Completing the pattern associated with Pascal’s Wager does not fit here.)
For me, this is an acknowledgement of confusion, not an excuse. I think that finding a decision theory that can make sense of this is extremely important and I try to act accordingly.
For me, this is an acknowledgement of confusion, not an excuse. I think that finding a decision theory that can make sense of this is extremely important and I try to act accordingly.
I would call the other half of what you had to say the confusing part—liked the linked paper by the way. It’s the ‘but you need to save it for other possible muggings’ would be straightforward game theory if the confusing part didn’t happen before we even got to ‘which mugger do we pay?’ considerations.
No, no, no!
There are an infinite number of possible Pascal’s muggings, but people only look at them one at a time. Why don’t you keep the $5 in case you need it for the next Pascal’s mugger who offers you 2^zillion units of utility? That is a much better bet if you only look at those two possible muggings.
The real problem is that utility functions, as we calculate them now, do not converge. This is a reason to be confused, not a reason to bite such ridiculous bullets.
(As you acknowledge, but with more emphasis) this is an excuse, not a real reason. You do not really care about having money primarily so that you can be prepared for the next pascal’s mugger. (Completing the pattern associated with Pascal’s Wager does not fit here.)
For me, this is an acknowledgement of confusion, not an excuse. I think that finding a decision theory that can make sense of this is extremely important and I try to act accordingly.
I would call the other half of what you had to say the confusing part—liked the linked paper by the way. It’s the ‘but you need to save it for other possible muggings’ would be straightforward game theory if the confusing part didn’t happen before we even got to ‘which mugger do we pay?’ considerations.
I agree; that was just an intuition pump to demonstrate the absurdity of only considering one mugger.
EDIT: I think of this intuition pump as very persuasive because it is part of how I came to this conclusion in the first place.