For example, in Pascal’s Mugging, a random person threatens to take away a zillion units of utility if you don’t pay them $5. The probability they can make good on their threat is miniscule, but by multiplying out by the size of the threat, it still ought to motivate you to give the money.
Why? Hasn’t this been gone over before? Tiny number * big number = not determined by the words “tiny” and “big”.
This has been gone over before and the result is that you should give the $5 dollars, because 3^^^3 is just a ridiculously huge number.
EDIT: What I meant to say was completely opposite to what I said. You should not give the $5 dollars, even though 3^^^3 is just a ridiculously huge number.
It has been gone over before and the result is that one shouldn’t give money to such a mugger.
See this comment and following discussion. First, you probably have a bounded utility function (to the extent you have a utility function at all), so it’s impossible for the mugger to actually offer that much utility (there is a tiny probability of being able to deliver many happy life-years or the like, but that’s different from the utility of your personal utility function). Second, if we increase the bound of the utility function, for any particular bound (no matter how high) there will be alternatives more likely to deliver vast utility than giving in to the mugger (conditional on vast utility being attainable, it is very unlikely the mugger’s obviously bogus offer is a good use of funds).
Hah! Oh the tragedy of a simple typo. I meant to type ‘not give’, and ‘even though’. Wow, I hate when I accidentally say the opposite of what I wanted.
The result of certain decision theories is to say that. That is a problem with those theories. That it is a problem, is the gist of the posting you cited.
I think it’s more accurate to say that it’s a ridiculously round number. That is, it’s both huge and simple. If someone tried to mug you with a random number between 3^^^3 and 3^^^^3, you wouldn’t take it, since that number is as complex, and therefor unlikely, as it is big.
Edit:
I changed my mind on this. The unlikeliness would come from him stating the number. Once he does that, the number is now very simple. Namely: it’s the number he just stated.
That said, the paradox from expected utility not converging is just due to the round ones.
I don’t think it really matters at that point. I would not treat the situation differently if the mugger said “3^^^3” or if he explicitly stated some number “34084549...843″.
I don’t think it really matters at that point. I would not treat the situation differently if the mugger said “3^^^3” or if he explicitly stated some number “34084549...843″.
I would pay $5 to not have to listen to the mugger explicitly state a number that long.
I don’t think you are appreciating the complexity penalty of the (presumably not very compressible) data hidden behind that ellipses, if the number is meant to be on the order fo 3^^^3.
Well, see, I would disagree with your presumption. The data might look random to you, but I could just point out that all the digits are actually taken from PI, starting with 3^^3rd digit. That simplifies the complexity tremendously. Or I could say I got those digits randomly. That again simplifies the complexity, because generating that number was simple.
If my presumption that the digits are not very compressible is wrong, then you have not really responded to Daniel’s point about the ridiculous roundness of the number (where roundness is one way a number can be compressible).
Or I could say I got those digits randomly. That again simplifies the complexity, because generating that number was simple.
No. Getting “random” digits is not simple, or even an available action, for a deterministic generator. Saying to get “random” data can feel simple because you are just pointing at some source of data that you are ignorant about, but really, you have to account for the complexity of that source of data.
I wonder how many $5 transfers I would get if I actually tried this sort of mugging on LessWrong. Physical proximity isn’t required, after all. Would you, or anyone, actually Paypal me $5 if I made the zillion-units threat? Or is this a case of intellectual acceptance, emotional reluctance?
You think that would drive people away from the site? You and wedrifid seem to take this astonishingly seriously. I thought it was clear I was merely musing about whether or not people really accepted Alexei’s conclusion. The mugging’s already been done by someone else, apparently, in any case; and I wasn’t saying I’d do it, only that I wondered if people (Alexei) really believed paying up was the most rational response. See his edit, which makes it a moot point.
You and wedrifid seem to take this astonishingly seriously.
I think your ‘seriousness’ evaluator is somewhat broken. It is generally frowned upon to make try his kind of thing explicit even when hypothetical but try to imagine the kind of actions I would take if I thought you actually represented a zillion-unit threat. Hint: they do not include blog comments.
I don’t understand the first sentence. Are you saying you were just being facetious in your advice?
Unless you were, I think my seriousness evaluation is just fine. Your responses may not be serious compared to, say, an actual zillion-unit threat-response, but I am surprised that you’d bring up the possibility of the latter at all. I understood your advisory quite well; what was somewhat astonishing was that you apparently felt someone on LessWrong might take a fanciful version of a fanciful thought experiment seriously enough to engage in a “non-blog-comment rational response”! (!)
It was also surprising to see that endoself felt people would be bothered enough by a Pascal’s Mugging to leave the site. These on top of the fact that I had no intention of actually posting a mugging, and meant my post to be a mere musing (“I wonder if … Would anyone”) on intellectual vs actual acceptance.
It is I who do not take this seriously enough, it appears! Though I myself have no intent to actually attempt said mugging, as stated before, I will point out that according to CarlShulman, user TimFreeman has already done so, and no shitstorm ensued… AFAIK.
None, the last time this was done by TimFreeman. And there’s no plausible set of assumptions under which paying the $5 is better than alternative uses of the money. See the comment linked to above.
Why? Hasn’t this been gone over before? Tiny number * big number = not determined by the words “tiny” and “big”.
Could you explain your position a bit more?
ETA: Ah, RichardKennaway expressed his position on Pascal’s Mugging here.
This has been gone over before and the result is that you should give the $5 dollars, because 3^^^3 is just a ridiculously huge number.
EDIT: What I meant to say was completely opposite to what I said. You should not give the $5 dollars, even though 3^^^3 is just a ridiculously huge number.
It has been gone over before and the result is that one shouldn’t give money to such a mugger.
See this comment and following discussion. First, you probably have a bounded utility function (to the extent you have a utility function at all), so it’s impossible for the mugger to actually offer that much utility (there is a tiny probability of being able to deliver many happy life-years or the like, but that’s different from the utility of your personal utility function). Second, if we increase the bound of the utility function, for any particular bound (no matter how high) there will be alternatives more likely to deliver vast utility than giving in to the mugger (conditional on vast utility being attainable, it is very unlikely the mugger’s obviously bogus offer is a good use of funds).
Hah! Oh the tragedy of a simple typo. I meant to type ‘not give’, and ‘even though’. Wow, I hate when I accidentally say the opposite of what I wanted.
The result of certain decision theories is to say that. That is a problem with those theories. That it is a problem, is the gist of the posting you cited.
I think it’s more accurate to say that it’s a ridiculously round number. That is, it’s both huge and simple. If someone tried to mug you with a random number between 3^^^3 and 3^^^^3, you wouldn’t take it, since that number is as complex, and therefor unlikely, as it is big.
Edit: I changed my mind on this. The unlikeliness would come from him stating the number. Once he does that, the number is now very simple. Namely: it’s the number he just stated.
That said, the paradox from expected utility not converging is just due to the round ones.
I don’t think it really matters at that point. I would not treat the situation differently if the mugger said “3^^^3” or if he explicitly stated some number “34084549...843″.
I would pay $5 to not have to listen to the mugger explicitly state a number that long.
I once offered a similar deal to a tuba player on a subway platform.
I don’t think you are appreciating the complexity penalty of the (presumably not very compressible) data hidden behind that ellipses, if the number is meant to be on the order fo 3^^^3.
Well, see, I would disagree with your presumption. The data might look random to you, but I could just point out that all the digits are actually taken from PI, starting with 3^^3rd digit. That simplifies the complexity tremendously. Or I could say I got those digits randomly. That again simplifies the complexity, because generating that number was simple.
If my presumption that the digits are not very compressible is wrong, then you have not really responded to Daniel’s point about the ridiculous roundness of the number (where roundness is one way a number can be compressible).
No. Getting “random” digits is not simple, or even an available action, for a deterministic generator. Saying to get “random” data can feel simple because you are just pointing at some source of data that you are ignorant about, but really, you have to account for the complexity of that source of data.
I wonder how many $5 transfers I would get if I actually tried this sort of mugging on LessWrong. Physical proximity isn’t required, after all. Would you, or anyone, actually Paypal me $5 if I made the zillion-units threat? Or is this a case of intellectual acceptance, emotional reluctance?
Please don’t do this. We don’t want to drive people who take their beliefs seriously away from the site.
I don’t mind if he does. It will encourage those who have silly beliefs to think them through a bit more clearly.
Mind you I would advise against making the threat. Because the rational response to threats is not necessarily compliance.
You think that would drive people away from the site? You and wedrifid seem to take this astonishingly seriously. I thought it was clear I was merely musing about whether or not people really accepted Alexei’s conclusion. The mugging’s already been done by someone else, apparently, in any case; and I wasn’t saying I’d do it, only that I wondered if people (Alexei) really believed paying up was the most rational response. See his edit, which makes it a moot point.
I think your ‘seriousness’ evaluator is somewhat broken. It is generally frowned upon to make try his kind of thing explicit even when hypothetical but try to imagine the kind of actions I would take if I thought you actually represented a zillion-unit threat. Hint: they do not include blog comments.
I don’t understand the first sentence. Are you saying you were just being facetious in your advice?
Unless you were, I think my seriousness evaluation is just fine. Your responses may not be serious compared to, say, an actual zillion-unit threat-response, but I am surprised that you’d bring up the possibility of the latter at all. I understood your advisory quite well; what was somewhat astonishing was that you apparently felt someone on LessWrong might take a fanciful version of a fanciful thought experiment seriously enough to engage in a “non-blog-comment rational response”! (!)
It was also surprising to see that endoself felt people would be bothered enough by a Pascal’s Mugging to leave the site. These on top of the fact that I had no intention of actually posting a mugging, and meant my post to be a mere musing (“I wonder if … Would anyone”) on intellectual vs actual acceptance.
It is I who do not take this seriously enough, it appears! Though I myself have no intent to actually attempt said mugging, as stated before, I will point out that according to CarlShulman, user TimFreeman has already done so, and no shitstorm ensued… AFAIK.
None, the last time this was done by TimFreeman. And there’s no plausible set of assumptions under which paying the $5 is better than alternative uses of the money. See the comment linked to above.
Ah, someone beat me to it, I see. Not a single transfer, eh?
I agree re: the advisability of paying up; Alexei’s comment led me to believe he thought the opposite, but I see from his edit he agrees too.