FWIW, I’m neurotypical and not exceptionally obnoxious.
Can’t speak for “people.” I can speak a little bit to why I do it, when I do.
One difficulty with comparing consequentialist from deontological ethical frameworks is the fact that in many plausible scenarios, they make the same predictions. I can talk about why it’s a bad idea to rob a bank in terms of its consequences, but a deontologist will just shrug and say “Or, you can just acknowledge that it’s wrong to rob banks, which is simpler,” and it’s not clear we’ve accomplished anything.
So to disambiguate them, it’s helpful to introduce cases where optimizing consequences requires violating deontological rules. And to turn up the contrast, it’s often helpful to (a) choose really significant deontological rules, rather than peripheral ones, and (b) introduce very large differences between the value of the +rules and -rules conditions.
Which leads to large relative disutilities.
Now, one can certainly say “But why is comparing consequentialist from deontological ethical frameworks so important that you’re willing to think about such awful things in order to do it? Can’t you come up with nicer examples? Or, if not, think about something else altogether?”
To which I won’t have a response.
As for the current example, I’m not exactly sure what point he’s making either, but see my comment on the post for my best guess as to what point he’s making, and my reaction to that point.
I think part of what bothers me about these things is I get the impression the readers of lesswrong are PICKING UP these neuroses from each other, learning by example that this is how you go about things.
Need to clarify an ethical question, or get an intuitive read on some esoteric decision theory thing, or just make a point? Add torture! If yudkowsky does it, it must be a rational and healthy way to think, right?
Interesting. Yeah, I can see where that impression comes from, though I’m not sure it’s accurate.
If you notice me using hypothetical suffering in examples where you can come up with an alternate example that expresses the same things except for the suffering, feel free to call me on it, either publicly or privately.
FWIW, I’m neurotypical and not exceptionally obnoxious.
Can’t speak for “people.” I can speak a little bit to why I do it, when I do.
One difficulty with comparing consequentialist from deontological ethical frameworks is the fact that in many plausible scenarios, they make the same predictions. I can talk about why it’s a bad idea to rob a bank in terms of its consequences, but a deontologist will just shrug and say “Or, you can just acknowledge that it’s wrong to rob banks, which is simpler,” and it’s not clear we’ve accomplished anything.
So to disambiguate them, it’s helpful to introduce cases where optimizing consequences requires violating deontological rules. And to turn up the contrast, it’s often helpful to (a) choose really significant deontological rules, rather than peripheral ones, and (b) introduce very large differences between the value of the +rules and -rules conditions.
Which leads to large relative disutilities.
Now, one can certainly say “But why is comparing consequentialist from deontological ethical frameworks so important that you’re willing to think about such awful things in order to do it? Can’t you come up with nicer examples? Or, if not, think about something else altogether?”
To which I won’t have a response.
As for the current example, I’m not exactly sure what point he’s making either, but see my comment on the post for my best guess as to what point he’s making, and my reaction to that point.
I think part of what bothers me about these things is I get the impression the readers of lesswrong are PICKING UP these neuroses from each other, learning by example that this is how you go about things.
Need to clarify an ethical question, or get an intuitive read on some esoteric decision theory thing, or just make a point? Add torture! If yudkowsky does it, it must be a rational and healthy way to think, right?
Interesting. Yeah, I can see where that impression comes from, though I’m not sure it’s accurate.
If you notice me using hypothetical suffering in examples where you can come up with an alternate example that expresses the same things except for the suffering, feel free to call me on it, either publicly or privately.