Is this perspective something that seems intuitively true to you, or is it something you’ve trained (and if so how?), or is it more that you are describing your intellectual rather than your emotional beliefs, or …?
It does seem like something that is intuitively true. I suspect having spent a lot of time considering bizarre duplication based counterfactuals has had some influence on my intuitions, bringing the intellectual and emotional beliefs somewhat closer together.
Also note that the emotion experience of identifying as ‘me’ isn’t an all or nothing question. Even in everyday experience the extent to which I self identify as ‘me’ does vary—although always in the high ranges. Which parts are me? comes in to it here. So would experimenting with localized magnetic stimulation of certain parts of the brain, if you really looked at the science!
Note that I (guess I) would not continue to identify with the other me as me indefinitely. It would probably go from like looking at a mirror (an abstracted intellectual one in this example) to only a vague feeling of association over time and depending on stimulus.
In the other direction there are definitely parts of my past history that I don’t experience as ‘me’ either—and not purely dependent on time. There are a couple of memories from when I was 5 that feel like me but some from even my twenties (I am less than thirty) that barely feel like me at all.
I compare this to the experience of turning into a vampire in Alicorn’s luminosity fanfiction. (FYI: That means a couple of days of extreme pain that does not cause any permanent damage.) While being tortured I may not feel all that much identification with either pre-torture human me or post torture vampire me. As vamp-wedrifid I would (probably) feel a somewhat higher identification with past-human-wedrifid as being ‘myself’. Say ballpark 80%. From the perspective of painful-half-turned-wedrifid the main difference in experience from the me in this Omega counterfactual would be the anticipation of being able to remember the torture as opposed to not. Knowing the way the time forks are set up It would make a little difference but not all that much.
Summary: Yes, the timeless perspective relates to actual anticipated experience not just intellectual abstraction.
I’ve been thinking about this some more, and I’d like to consult your intuitions on some related questions, if you don’t mind.
Suppose I come along at T1 and noninvasively copy you into a form capable of effectively hosting everything important about you. (E.g., a software upload, or a clone body, or whatever it takes.) I don’t tell either of you about the other’s existence.
Let’s label the resulting wedrifids W1 and W2 for convenience. (Labels randomly assigned to the post-copy yous.)
I then at T2 convert W2 into a chunk of pure orgasmium (O).
If I’ve understood your view, you would say that at T2, W1 undergoes a utility change (equal to [value(W2) - value(O)]), though of course W1 is unaware of the fact. Yes?
Whereas in an alternative scenario where at T2 I create a chunk of orgasmium (O2) out of interstellar hydrogen, without copying you first, W1 (which is uniquely you) doesn’t experience any utility change at all at T2. Yes?
Feel free to replace the orgasmium with anything else… rocks, a different person altogether, a puppy, W2 experiencing a thousand years of torture, etc. …. if that changes your intuitions.
As situations become harder to imagine in an tangible sense it becomes harder extrapolate from intuitions meaningfully. But I can give some response in this case.
I then at T2 convert W2 into a chunk of pure orgasmium (O).
If I’ve understood your view, you would say that at T2, W1 undergoes a utility change (equal to [value(W2) - value(O)]), though of course W1 is unaware of the fact. Yes?
Utility functions operate over entire configuration states of the universe—values of objects or beings in the universe can not by default be added or subtracted. Crudely speaking W1 undergoes a utility change of value(universe has W1, O) - value(universe has W1, W2). The change would be significant—clones have value. And this is the first clone. Transforming a hypothetical W534 into orgasmium would be a far, far lesser loss.
Whereas in an alternative scenario where at T2 I create a chunk of orgasmium (O2) out of interstellar hydrogen, without copying you first, W1 (which is uniquely you) doesn’t experience any utility change at all at T2. Yes?
It is worth elaborating here that the states of the universe that utility is evaluated on are timeless. The entire wave equation gets thrown in, not just a state at a specific time. This means [W1, hydrogen → W1, W2 → W1, O] can be preferred over [W1, hydrogen → W1, O], or anti-preferred as appropriate without it being an exceptional case. This is matches the intuitions most people have in everyday use—it just formulates it coherently.
In this case W1 does not seem to care all that much about what happened at T2. Maybe a little. Orgasmium sounds kind of more interesting to have around than hydrogen.
Also note that the transition at T1 leaves W2′s utility function at a high percentage of W1′s—although W2 definitely doesn’t know about it!
Totally agreed about identifying-as-me being a complex thing, and looking at brain science contributing to it. Actually, when I first encountered the concept of blindsight as an undergraduate, it pretty much destroyed my intuition of unique identity.
I guess I just haven’t thought carefully enough about self-duplication scenarios.
It does seem like something that is intuitively true. I suspect having spent a lot of time considering bizarre duplication based counterfactuals has had some influence on my intuitions, bringing the intellectual and emotional beliefs somewhat closer together.
Also note that the emotion experience of identifying as ‘me’ isn’t an all or nothing question. Even in everyday experience the extent to which I self identify as ‘me’ does vary—although always in the high ranges. Which parts are me? comes in to it here. So would experimenting with localized magnetic stimulation of certain parts of the brain, if you really looked at the science!
Note that I (guess I) would not continue to identify with the other me as me indefinitely. It would probably go from like looking at a mirror (an abstracted intellectual one in this example) to only a vague feeling of association over time and depending on stimulus.
In the other direction there are definitely parts of my past history that I don’t experience as ‘me’ either—and not purely dependent on time. There are a couple of memories from when I was 5 that feel like me but some from even my twenties (I am less than thirty) that barely feel like me at all.
I compare this to the experience of turning into a vampire in Alicorn’s luminosity fanfiction. (FYI: That means a couple of days of extreme pain that does not cause any permanent damage.) While being tortured I may not feel all that much identification with either pre-torture human me or post torture vampire me. As vamp-wedrifid I would (probably) feel a somewhat higher identification with past-human-wedrifid as being ‘myself’. Say ballpark 80%. From the perspective of painful-half-turned-wedrifid the main difference in experience from the me in this Omega counterfactual would be the anticipation of being able to remember the torture as opposed to not. Knowing the way the time forks are set up It would make a little difference but not all that much.
Summary: Yes, the timeless perspective relates to actual anticipated experience not just intellectual abstraction.
I’ve been thinking about this some more, and I’d like to consult your intuitions on some related questions, if you don’t mind.
Suppose I come along at T1 and noninvasively copy you into a form capable of effectively hosting everything important about you. (E.g., a software upload, or a clone body, or whatever it takes.) I don’t tell either of you about the other’s existence.
Let’s label the resulting wedrifids W1 and W2 for convenience. (Labels randomly assigned to the post-copy yous.)
I then at T2 convert W2 into a chunk of pure orgasmium (O).
If I’ve understood your view, you would say that at T2, W1 undergoes a utility change (equal to [value(W2) - value(O)]), though of course W1 is unaware of the fact. Yes?
Whereas in an alternative scenario where at T2 I create a chunk of orgasmium (O2) out of interstellar hydrogen, without copying you first, W1 (which is uniquely you) doesn’t experience any utility change at all at T2. Yes?
Feel free to replace the orgasmium with anything else… rocks, a different person altogether, a puppy, W2 experiencing a thousand years of torture, etc. …. if that changes your intuitions.
As situations become harder to imagine in an tangible sense it becomes harder extrapolate from intuitions meaningfully. But I can give some response in this case.
Utility functions operate over entire configuration states of the universe—values of objects or beings in the universe can not by default be added or subtracted. Crudely speaking W1 undergoes a utility change of value(universe has W1, O) - value(universe has W1, W2). The change would be significant—clones have value. And this is the first clone. Transforming a hypothetical W534 into orgasmium would be a far, far lesser loss.
It is worth elaborating here that the states of the universe that utility is evaluated on are timeless. The entire wave equation gets thrown in, not just a state at a specific time. This means [W1, hydrogen → W1, W2 → W1, O] can be preferred over [W1, hydrogen → W1, O], or anti-preferred as appropriate without it being an exceptional case. This is matches the intuitions most people have in everyday use—it just formulates it coherently.
In this case W1 does not seem to care all that much about what happened at T2. Maybe a little. Orgasmium sounds kind of more interesting to have around than hydrogen.
Also note that the transition at T1 leaves W2′s utility function at a high percentage of W1′s—although W2 definitely doesn’t know about it!
Huh.
I’m not sure I even followed that. I’ll have to stare at it a while longer. Thanks again for a thoughtful reply.
Neat. I’m somewhat envious.
Totally agreed about identifying-as-me being a complex thing, and looking at brain science contributing to it. Actually, when I first encountered the concept of blindsight as an undergraduate, it pretty much destroyed my intuition of unique identity.
I guess I just haven’t thought carefully enough about self-duplication scenarios.
Thanks for the thoughtful reply.