For a definition of “effectively” such that future lifespan >> 1000 years, yes. The uploading process as described will be that painful for everyone, so either:
a) Everyone will spend roughly the same amount of time getting over the pain, and I wouldn’t miss much of significance or be specifically disadvantaged.
or
b) Being uploaded would afford us the capability to delete our memories of the pain; so, though it would be experienced, it wouldn’t have to be remembered, reducing its overall effect.
This response assumes that the experience of the pain during the uploading process, even if remembered, wouldn’t interfere significantly with the upload’s fidelity to the previous brain state. In other words, we wouldn’t be warped beyond recognition upon completing the upload.
I don’t think you are interpreting the hypothetical as Prismatic intended. You split into two versions, one of which is an upload of you right before the pain starts. The other version (your brain undergoing something like very slow deconstruction) experiences a thousand years of agony.
Oh, I see. That does challenge my usual conception of identity more than my initial interpretation.
In essence, then, this is asking if I would choose to sacrifice myself in order to preserve myself. I believe that I like myself enough to do that. If my exact brain-state continues onward while the “original” experiences the pain, my identity does diverge, but it does so after I make the choice to press the button. In that sense, my identity continues, while also being tortured. The continuation, given its time span, seems ultimately more important when considering the alternative of ceasing to exist altogether.
For a definition of “effectively” such that future lifespan >> 1000 years, yes. The uploading process as described will be that painful for everyone, so either:
a) Everyone will spend roughly the same amount of time getting over the pain, and I wouldn’t miss much of significance or be specifically disadvantaged.
or
b) Being uploaded would afford us the capability to delete our memories of the pain; so, though it would be experienced, it wouldn’t have to be remembered, reducing its overall effect.
This response assumes that the experience of the pain during the uploading process, even if remembered, wouldn’t interfere significantly with the upload’s fidelity to the previous brain state. In other words, we wouldn’t be warped beyond recognition upon completing the upload.
I don’t think you are interpreting the hypothetical as Prismatic intended. You split into two versions, one of which is an upload of you right before the pain starts. The other version (your brain undergoing something like very slow deconstruction) experiences a thousand years of agony.
Oh, I see. That does challenge my usual conception of identity more than my initial interpretation.
In essence, then, this is asking if I would choose to sacrifice myself in order to preserve myself. I believe that I like myself enough to do that. If my exact brain-state continues onward while the “original” experiences the pain, my identity does diverge, but it does so after I make the choice to press the button. In that sense, my identity continues, while also being tortured. The continuation, given its time span, seems ultimately more important when considering the alternative of ceasing to exist altogether.