It’s really unclear to me how I’m supposed to account for these future selves’ expressed preferences, in that case.
In the case that the tortured-you would make the same decision all over again, my intuition (I think) agrees with yours. My objection is basically to splitting off “selves” and subjecting them to things that the post-split self would never consent to.
OTOH, I do think I can consent now to consequences that my future self will have to suffer, even if my future self will at that point—when the benefits are past, and the costs are current—withdraw that consent.
It’s really unclear to me how I’m supposed to account for these future selves’ expressed preferences, in that case.
In the case that the tortured-you would make the same decision all over again, my intuition (I think) agrees with yours. My objection is basically to splitting off “selves” and subjecting them to things that the post-split self would never consent to.
(nods) That’s reasonable.
OTOH, I do think I can consent now to consequences that my future self will have to suffer, even if my future self will at that point—when the benefits are past, and the costs are current—withdraw that consent.