The paragraph you quote from Volkman is arguing not that copyright is an obvious consequence of the right to property, but that the possibility of copyright is an obvious consequence of the right to make arbitrary contracts. I agree: it is (and so are lots and lots of other possibilities). But that’s not at all the same as saying that copyright is a consequence of the right to property.
The rest of Volkman’s paper does attempt to argue something nearer to what you said, but I have to say I don’t find it very convincing. He begins well enough, by saying that you aren’t obliged to write books or software or whatever if you don’t like the ways in which they will be used. But then he abruptly changes the subject, apparently without noticing, when he says:
So, you have no claim on the product of my labor, at least where that product would not exist were it not for my actions.
which in fact doesn’t at all follow from what’s gone before because it’s a statement about “the product of my labor” whereas all the previous argument has been concerned with the labor itself. Now, that doesn’t mean that this new statement is wrong, just that it’s misleading to introduce it with “so”. And in Locke’s view, AIUI, the product of one’s labor is indeed one’s own to do with as one pleases. But here we run up against a key difference between “intellectual property” and more traditional sorts of property. It’s much more obvious that (A) if I go to a lot of effort to make something, then others should not take it away from me, than that (B) if I go to a lot of effort to make something, then others should not look at what I’ve done and then make (near-)identical things for themselves. And while I’m willing to grant Lockeans premise (A), I’m not so willing with premise (B).
After that, Volkman spends a few paragraphs on matters that aren’t (I think) directly relevant here and then turns to the argument you’ve cited above. As I’ve already said, this also doesn’t show that copyright (or any other sort of intellectual property right) is a necessary consequence of the right to property, or that Lockeans or libertarians ought to approve of it. The most it shows is that you and I may make a contract that says you’ll write a book and show it to me provided I promise not to give copies to anyone else. But such a contract can’t possibly bind anyone else; your protection against others’ actions, as far as that contract goes, is limited to being able to insist that I take steps to stop anyone else getting hold of the book. Whereas the whole idea of a copyright (and also a patent or trademark) is that a creator automatically gets to restrict the actions of everyone else, including lots and lots and lots of people who never entered into any sort of contract with her.
I disagree that they [sc. copyrights, patents and trademarks] are not at all the same as one another; they are pretty much the only cases where one can own a pattern rather than a particular object.
Sure, they have something in common. (Though I suggest that your choice of the word “own” is at least partly because we happen to use the term “intellectual property” to describe these things. If it weren’t for that term, I suspect it wouldn’t feel at all natural to say that one owns a trademark, for instance; “controls” or “have the right to use” would be better.)
But I wasn’t denying that they have something in common. Just seeking clarity as to what particular sort(s) of “intellectual property” you think follow from (ordinary) property rights. It looks to me as if both Volkman’s arguments, such as they are, apply to copyrights; the first applies to patents but the second doesn’t; and neither applies to trademarks. (But maybe if it’s possible to adapt his right-to-contract argument to cover copying done by people who aren’t party to a contract with the creator, that will enable it to apply to patents and/or trademarks too.)
But such a contract can’t possibly bind anyone else; your protection against others’ actions, as far as that contract goes, is limited to being able to insist that I take steps to stop anyone else getting hold of the book. Whereas the whole idea of a copyright (and also a patent or trademark) is that a creator automatically gets to restrict the actions of everyone else, including lots and lots and lots of people who never entered into any sort of contract with her.
And indeed, that contract can insist that before showing the book to anyone else, the recipient must require them to sign a similar contract. Thus, under such a system copyright could exist as a direct consequence of contracts, but you’d have to bring a lawyer to the library, and you’d be at risk for damages for being negligent in locking up your books. But if the vast majority would want their books to be bound by such contracts, then a lot of time and money could be saved for everyone by enshrining copyright in the law.
Precisely similar lines of reasoning, of course, apply to most of the other things that libertarians often dislike, such as taxes and national armies and state-run education. (It’s debatable whether they work, but then the same goes for the argument you’re offering.)
such as taxes and national armies and state-run education
Even better, a similar argument could be made in favor of state-sponsored charity. Though there is reason to suspect the government would not be very efficient in such endeavors.
The paragraph you quote from Volkman is arguing not that copyright is an obvious consequence of the right to property, but that the possibility of copyright is an obvious consequence of the right to make arbitrary contracts. I agree: it is (and so are lots and lots of other possibilities). But that’s not at all the same as saying that copyright is a consequence of the right to property.
The rest of Volkman’s paper does attempt to argue something nearer to what you said, but I have to say I don’t find it very convincing. He begins well enough, by saying that you aren’t obliged to write books or software or whatever if you don’t like the ways in which they will be used. But then he abruptly changes the subject, apparently without noticing, when he says:
which in fact doesn’t at all follow from what’s gone before because it’s a statement about “the product of my labor” whereas all the previous argument has been concerned with the labor itself. Now, that doesn’t mean that this new statement is wrong, just that it’s misleading to introduce it with “so”. And in Locke’s view, AIUI, the product of one’s labor is indeed one’s own to do with as one pleases. But here we run up against a key difference between “intellectual property” and more traditional sorts of property. It’s much more obvious that (A) if I go to a lot of effort to make something, then others should not take it away from me, than that (B) if I go to a lot of effort to make something, then others should not look at what I’ve done and then make (near-)identical things for themselves. And while I’m willing to grant Lockeans premise (A), I’m not so willing with premise (B).
After that, Volkman spends a few paragraphs on matters that aren’t (I think) directly relevant here and then turns to the argument you’ve cited above. As I’ve already said, this also doesn’t show that copyright (or any other sort of intellectual property right) is a necessary consequence of the right to property, or that Lockeans or libertarians ought to approve of it. The most it shows is that you and I may make a contract that says you’ll write a book and show it to me provided I promise not to give copies to anyone else. But such a contract can’t possibly bind anyone else; your protection against others’ actions, as far as that contract goes, is limited to being able to insist that I take steps to stop anyone else getting hold of the book. Whereas the whole idea of a copyright (and also a patent or trademark) is that a creator automatically gets to restrict the actions of everyone else, including lots and lots and lots of people who never entered into any sort of contract with her.
Sure, they have something in common. (Though I suggest that your choice of the word “own” is at least partly because we happen to use the term “intellectual property” to describe these things. If it weren’t for that term, I suspect it wouldn’t feel at all natural to say that one owns a trademark, for instance; “controls” or “have the right to use” would be better.)
But I wasn’t denying that they have something in common. Just seeking clarity as to what particular sort(s) of “intellectual property” you think follow from (ordinary) property rights. It looks to me as if both Volkman’s arguments, such as they are, apply to copyrights; the first applies to patents but the second doesn’t; and neither applies to trademarks. (But maybe if it’s possible to adapt his right-to-contract argument to cover copying done by people who aren’t party to a contract with the creator, that will enable it to apply to patents and/or trademarks too.)
And indeed, that contract can insist that before showing the book to anyone else, the recipient must require them to sign a similar contract. Thus, under such a system copyright could exist as a direct consequence of contracts, but you’d have to bring a lawyer to the library, and you’d be at risk for damages for being negligent in locking up your books. But if the vast majority would want their books to be bound by such contracts, then a lot of time and money could be saved for everyone by enshrining copyright in the law.
Precisely similar lines of reasoning, of course, apply to most of the other things that libertarians often dislike, such as taxes and national armies and state-run education. (It’s debatable whether they work, but then the same goes for the argument you’re offering.)
Even better, a similar argument could be made in favor of state-sponsored charity. Though there is reason to suspect the government would not be very efficient in such endeavors.