This is because the [satisficing] objective is bounded and, if relatively easily achievable, there is a much less of a strong incentive towards instrumental convergence to generic power-seeking behaviour.
Depending on what we mean by “satisficing”, I think this isn’t (theoretically) true of the formal satisficer agent. Have you read my post Satisficers Tend To Seek Power: Instrumental Convergence Via Retargetability, or—in its modern form—Parametrically retargetable decision-makers tend to seek power?
(That said, I don’t think those particular power-seeking arguments apply to the real-world policies which we describe as “satisficing.”)
Depending on what we mean by “satisficing”, I think this isn’t (theoretically) true of the formal satisficer agent. Have you read my post Satisficers Tend To Seek Power: Instrumental Convergence Via Retargetability, or—in its modern form—Parametrically retargetable decision-makers tend to seek power?
(That said, I don’t think those particular power-seeking arguments apply to the real-world policies which we describe as “satisficing.”)