Let’s say you precommit to never paying off blackmailers. The advantage of this is that you are no longer an attractive target for blackmailers since they will never get paid off. However if someone blackmails you anyway, your precommitment now puts you at a disadvantage, so now (NDT)you would act as if you had a precommitment to comply with the blackmailers all along since at this point that would be an advantageous precommitment to have made.
I think my definition of NDT above was worded badly. The problematic part is “if he had previously known he’d be in his currently situation.” Consider this definition:
You should always make the decision that a CDT-agent would have wished he had precommitted to, if he previously considered the possibility of his current situation and had the opportunity to costlessly precommit to a decision.
The key is that the NDT agent isn’t behaving as if he knew for sure that he’d end up blackmailed when he made his precommitment (since his precommitment affects the probability of his being blackmailed), but rather he’s acting “as if” he precommitted to some behavior based on reasonable estimates of the likelihood of his being kidnapped in various cases.
But if you pay the blackmailer, then you didn’t precommit to not paying him, in which case you’ll wish you did since then you probably wouldn’t get blackmailed. You’ll act as if you precommit if and only of you do not.
Perhaps you’d end up precommitting to some probability of paying the blackmailer?
Let’s say you precommit to never paying off blackmailers. The advantage of this is that you are no longer an attractive target for blackmailers since they will never get paid off. However if someone blackmails you anyway, your precommitment now puts you at a disadvantage, so now (NDT)you would act as if you had a precommitment to comply with the blackmailers all along since at this point that would be an advantageous precommitment to have made.
The harder part is precisely defining what constitutes blackmail.
It seems that this is more of a bluff than a true precommitment.
I think my definition of NDT above was worded badly. The problematic part is “if he had previously known he’d be in his currently situation.” Consider this definition:
You should always make the decision that a CDT-agent would have wished he had precommitted to, if he previously considered the possibility of his current situation and had the opportunity to costlessly precommit to a decision.
The key is that the NDT agent isn’t behaving as if he knew for sure that he’d end up blackmailed when he made his precommitment (since his precommitment affects the probability of his being blackmailed), but rather he’s acting “as if” he precommitted to some behavior based on reasonable estimates of the likelihood of his being kidnapped in various cases.
But if you pay the blackmailer, then you didn’t precommit to not paying him, in which case you’ll wish you did since then you probably wouldn’t get blackmailed. You’ll act as if you precommit if and only of you do not.
Perhaps you’d end up precommitting to some probability of paying the blackmailer?