“Humans have played brinkmanship with nuclear weapons for 60 years. Strategically, a credible threat of offensive nuclear strike has had a long history of being fundamental to coercing policy change out of an adversary. Strong signals must be costly, or else everyone would make strong signals them, and then they would cease to be strong (Bryan Caplan). Before the nuclear bomb, human beings played brinkmanship with war itself, for centuries; at the time, initiating war was the closest equivalent to initiating nuclear war).
We must not play brinkmanship by inventing self-improving AI systems, specifically AI systems that run the risk of rapidly becoming smarter than humans. It may have been possible to de-escalate with nuclear missiles, but it was never conceivable to un-invent the nuclear bomb”
“Humans have played brinkmanship with nuclear weapons for 60 years. Strategically, a credible threat of offensive nuclear strike has had a long history of being fundamental to coercing policy change out of an adversary. Strong signals must be costly, or else everyone would make strong signals them, and then they would cease to be strong (Bryan Caplan). Before the nuclear bomb, human beings played brinkmanship with war itself, for centuries; at the time, initiating war was the closest equivalent to initiating nuclear war).
We must not play brinkmanship by inventing self-improving AI systems, specifically AI systems that run the risk of rapidly becoming smarter than humans. It may have been possible to de-escalate with nuclear missiles, but it was never conceivable to un-invent the nuclear bomb”