Hmm, it seems my class on free will may actually be useful.
Eliezer: you may be interested to know that your position corresponds almost precisely to what we call classical compatibilism. I was likewise a classical compatibilist before taking my course—under ordinary circumstances, it is quite a simple and satisfactory theory. (It could be your version is substantially more robust than the one I abandoned, of course. For one, you would probably avoid the usual trap of declaring that agents are responsible for acts if and only if the acts proceed from their free will.)
Hopefully Anonymous: Are you using Eliezer’s definition of “could”, here? Remember, Eliezer is saying “John could jump off the cliff” means “If John wanted, John would jump off the cliff”—it’s a counterfactual. If you reject this definition as a possible source of free will, you should do so explicitly.
Hmm, it seems my class on free will may actually be useful.
Eliezer: you may be interested to know that your position corresponds almost precisely to what we call classical compatibilism. I was likewise a classical compatibilist before taking my course—under ordinary circumstances, it is quite a simple and satisfactory theory. (It could be your version is substantially more robust than the one I abandoned, of course. For one, you would probably avoid the usual trap of declaring that agents are responsible for acts if and only if the acts proceed from their free will.)
Hopefully Anonymous: Are you using Eliezer’s definition of “could”, here? Remember, Eliezer is saying “John could jump off the cliff” means “If John wanted, John would jump off the cliff”—it’s a counterfactual. If you reject this definition as a possible source of free will, you should do so explicitly.