I don’t get why you think facts and conventions are mutually exclusive. Don’t you think it’s a fact that the American President’s name is Barack Obama?
I think it’s a fact that there’s a widespread convention of referring to him by that name.
I also think it’s a fact that there’s a widespread taboo against stealing stuff. I don’t think it’s a fact that stealing stuff is wrong, unless you’re using “wrong” as a shorthand to refer to things that have strong/widespread taboos against them. (Once you use the word this way, an argument about whether stealing is wrong becomes an argument over what taboos prevail in the population—not a traditional argument about ethics exactly, is it? So this usage is nonstandard.)
I don’t think it’s a fact that stealing stuff is wrong, unless you’re using “wrong” as a shorthand to refer to things that have strong/widespread taboos against them.
But you also said that some such widespread conventions/taboos are good conventions. From your OP:
Yes, the rule that you can’t kill people is a very good convention, and it makes sense to have heavy default punishments for breaking it.
So, here’s a meta-question for you. Do you think it is a fact that “the rule that you can’t kill people is a very good convention”. Or was that just a matter of subjective opinion, which you expressed in the form of a factual claim for rhetorical impact? Or is it itself a convention (i.e. we have conventions to call certain things “good” and “bad” in the same way we have conventions to call certain things “right” and “wrong”)?
On a related point, notice that certain conventions do create facts. It is a convention that Obama is called president, but also a fact that he is president. It is a convention that dollar bills can be used as money, and a fact that they are a form of money.
Or imagine arguing the following “It is a convention that objects with flat surfaces and four solid legs supporting them are called tables, but that doesn’t mean there are any real tables”.
Do you think it is a fact that “the rule that you can’t kill people is a very good convention”.
It’s a fact that it’s a good convention for helping to achieve my values. So yeah, “the rule that you can’t kill people is a very good convention” is a subjective value claim. I didn’t mean to frame it as a factual claim. Any time you see me use the word “good”, you can probably interpret as shorthand for “good according to my values”.
It is a convention that Obama is called president, but also a fact that he is president.
The “fact” that Obama is president is only social truth. Obama is president because we decided he is. If no one thought Obama was president, he wouldn’t be president anymore.
The only sense in which “Obama is president” is a true fact is if it’s shorthand for something like “many people think Obama is president and he has de facto power over the executive branch of the US government”. (Or you could use it as shorthand for “Obama is president according to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of US laws” or something like that, I guess.)
In medieval times, at one point, there were competing popes. If I said “Clement VII is pope”, that would be a malformed factual claim, ’cause it’s not clear how to interpret the shorthand (what sensory experiences would we expect if the proposition “Clement VII is pope” is true?). In this case, the shorthand reveals its insufficiency, and you realize that a conventional claim like this only becomes a factual claim when it’s paired with a group of people that respects the convention (“Clement VII is considered the pope in France” is a better-formed factual claim, as is “Clement VII is considered the pope everywhere”. Only the first is true.). Oftentimes the relevant group is implied and not necessary to state (“Obama is considered US president by 99+% of those who have an opinion on the issue”).
People do argue over conventional stuff all the time, but these aren’t arguments over anticipation (“My pope is legit, yours is not!”). Some moral arguments (“abortion is murder!”) follow the same form.
You seem to be overlooking the fact that facts involving contextual language are facts nonetheless.
The “fact” that Obama is president is only social truth. Obama is president because we decided he is. If no one >thought Obama was president, he wouldn’t be president anymore.
There is a counterfactual sense in which this holds some weight. I’m not saying agree with your claim, but I would at least have to give it more consideration before I knew what to conclude.
But that simply isn’t the case (& it’s a fact that it isn’t, of course). Obama’s (present) presidency is not contested, and it is a fact that he is President of the United States.
You could try to argue against admitting facts involving any vagueness of language, but you would run into two problems: this is more an issue with language than an issue with facts; and you have already admitted facts about other things.
I don’t get why you think facts and conventions are mutually exclusive. Don’t you think it’s a fact that the American President’s name is Barack Obama?
I think it’s a fact that there’s a widespread convention of referring to him by that name.
I also think it’s a fact that there’s a widespread taboo against stealing stuff. I don’t think it’s a fact that stealing stuff is wrong, unless you’re using “wrong” as a shorthand to refer to things that have strong/widespread taboos against them. (Once you use the word this way, an argument about whether stealing is wrong becomes an argument over what taboos prevail in the population—not a traditional argument about ethics exactly, is it? So this usage is nonstandard.)
But you also said that some such widespread conventions/taboos are good conventions. From your OP:
So, here’s a meta-question for you. Do you think it is a fact that “the rule that you can’t kill people is a very good convention”. Or was that just a matter of subjective opinion, which you expressed in the form of a factual claim for rhetorical impact? Or is it itself a convention (i.e. we have conventions to call certain things “good” and “bad” in the same way we have conventions to call certain things “right” and “wrong”)?
On a related point, notice that certain conventions do create facts. It is a convention that Obama is called president, but also a fact that he is president. It is a convention that dollar bills can be used as money, and a fact that they are a form of money.
Or imagine arguing the following “It is a convention that objects with flat surfaces and four solid legs supporting them are called tables, but that doesn’t mean there are any real tables”.
It’s a fact that it’s a good convention for helping to achieve my values. So yeah, “the rule that you can’t kill people is a very good convention” is a subjective value claim. I didn’t mean to frame it as a factual claim. Any time you see me use the word “good”, you can probably interpret as shorthand for “good according to my values”.
The “fact” that Obama is president is only social truth. Obama is president because we decided he is. If no one thought Obama was president, he wouldn’t be president anymore.
The only sense in which “Obama is president” is a true fact is if it’s shorthand for something like “many people think Obama is president and he has de facto power over the executive branch of the US government”. (Or you could use it as shorthand for “Obama is president according to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of US laws” or something like that, I guess.)
In medieval times, at one point, there were competing popes. If I said “Clement VII is pope”, that would be a malformed factual claim, ’cause it’s not clear how to interpret the shorthand (what sensory experiences would we expect if the proposition “Clement VII is pope” is true?). In this case, the shorthand reveals its insufficiency, and you realize that a conventional claim like this only becomes a factual claim when it’s paired with a group of people that respects the convention (“Clement VII is considered the pope in France” is a better-formed factual claim, as is “Clement VII is considered the pope everywhere”. Only the first is true.). Oftentimes the relevant group is implied and not necessary to state (“Obama is considered US president by 99+% of those who have an opinion on the issue”).
People do argue over conventional stuff all the time, but these aren’t arguments over anticipation (“My pope is legit, yours is not!”). Some moral arguments (“abortion is murder!”) follow the same form.
You seem to be overlooking the fact that facts involving contextual language are facts nonetheless.
There is a counterfactual sense in which this holds some weight. I’m not saying agree with your claim, but I would at least have to give it more consideration before I knew what to conclude.
But that simply isn’t the case (& it’s a fact that it isn’t, of course). Obama’s (present) presidency is not contested, and it is a fact that he is President of the United States.
You could try to argue against admitting facts involving any vagueness of language, but you would run into two problems: this is more an issue with language than an issue with facts; and you have already admitted facts about other things.