Eg, under mind-brain identity theory, my mind isnt going to jump around while I’m asleep because my brain doesn’t.
I do not subscribe to brain-mind identity theory. I consider the ‘pattern’ which is the mind to be fundamentally different, even if it is written on the brain.
What do you mean by overlay?
Basically, that you are in all universes at once which generate your experiences. Some more than others.
Eg, under mind-brain identity theory, my mind isnt going to jump around while I’m asleep because my brain doesn’t.
I do not subscribe to brain-mind identity theory. I consider the ‘pattern’ which is the mind to be fundamentally different, even if it is written on the brain.
If you did subscribe to mind brain identity theory, you wouldn’t have to struggle to find a way of explaining why the jumping you don’t predict but don’t observe doesn’t occur. Adopting a theory that doesn’t match observation, and then bolting on more theory to solve the problem is kind of not good.
If you did subscribe to mind brain identity theory, you wouldn’t have to struggle to find a way of explaining why the jumping you don’t predict but don’t observe doesn’t occur.
I can’t ‘observe’ jumping by definition.
Adopting a theory that doesn’t match observation, and then bolting on more theory to solve the problem is kind of not good.
If you were concerned about jumping and jumping was merely ‘extremely difficult to observe’, that would probably be ok.
However, if you can’t observe jumping by definition and are still concerned about it, that’s called a ‘cognitive defect’, and you should fix it. Fix the cognitive defect, that is. The one in your head. The one that’s making you be irrationally concerned over a defined unobservable.
No amount of handwaving, being concerned, or liking your current ‘subjective reality’ is going to make your unobservable observable. Fix the core problem, don’t try to paper over it.
The standard worry about DT is that (from the outside) a coherent thread of consciousnes goes though a set of incoherent external world states, which, for, the inside, would look like observing chaos. You have said that what you are worried about is observing chaos, although you have also said that you have a solution to the no-physical-law problem of DT. So who knows?
ETA If you jump, but don’t notice you are jumping, what is the problem.
You’ve also said that what you are worried about is something to do,with measure, although there is an answer to that as well...so....whatever.
Why should it disobey every observed law of physics? Are you arguing that conscious observers would almost certainly experience chaos? If so I agree with you. I don’t accept ‘pure’ Dust Theory.
Observing chaos is the same thing as having no discernible physical laws.
ETA If you jump, but don’t notice you are jumping, what is the problem.
The problem is that I prefer for my subjective consciousness to stay in one world.
Why should it disobey every observed law of physics? Are you arguing that conscious observers would almost certainly experience chaos? If so I agree with you. I don’t accept ‘pure’ Dust Theory.
Observing chaos is the same thing as having no discernible physical laws.
I took your use of the word ‘worried’ to say that I was afraid this was true.
Why?
Because I subjectively value my universe and do not wish to go to another one.
Under MWI and DT, which are not the same theory, you dont go to another universe, in the sense of leaving the old one..
Under physicalism+simulationusmism, which is not the same as the other two, you can cease to exist at one point in time, and be resurrected in a simulation millions of years later. But I don’t see how staying awake would prevent that.
Basically, that you are in all universes at once which generate your experiences. Some more than others.
Arguably, i would have no way of knowing whether or not I am in a supposition of identical mind states or world states, because they’re identical. Why would a difference that doesn’t make a difference, make a difference?
But is it rational to entertain theories about differences in external reality that could never make any difference to subjective or objective experience?
I value other minds existing to interact with me, even if I can’t perceive them directly. And I value waking up tomorrow in the same universe (more or less) that I’m in now.
Is this rational? Eliezer defines rationality as systematized winning; I’m pointing out what.
Under DT, and MWI, which are not the same, you wake up in all the universes you were ever in.
ETA
You might have a concern about your measure being dominated by simulations.That isnt the same as jumping. Also, you can only be simulated if you ever had a real life, so it’s possible to take the glass half full view, that the simulations are a bonus to a fully real life, not a dilution.
What do you mean, we’re attractors to other consciousnesses?
A wide variety of minds that shift realities when they lose consciousness. Our minds seem optimized to prevent this from happening.
That sentence no verb.
Or it’s just not possible.
Than please please please explain why. Remember, pure Dust Theory doesn’t need to be true- only the overlay of identical minds.
Eg, under mind-brain identity theory, my mind isnt going to jump around while I’m asleep because my brain doesn’t.
What do you mean by overlay?
I do not subscribe to brain-mind identity theory. I consider the ‘pattern’ which is the mind to be fundamentally different, even if it is written on the brain.
Basically, that you are in all universes at once which generate your experiences. Some more than others.
If you did subscribe to mind brain identity theory, you wouldn’t have to struggle to find a way of explaining why the jumping you don’t predict but don’t observe doesn’t occur. Adopting a theory that doesn’t match observation, and then bolting on more theory to solve the problem is kind of not good.
I can’t ‘observe’ jumping by definition.
That’s not even close to what I’m doing.
If you were concerned about jumping and jumping was merely ‘extremely difficult to observe’, that would probably be ok.
However, if you can’t observe jumping by definition and are still concerned about it, that’s called a ‘cognitive defect’, and you should fix it. Fix the cognitive defect, that is. The one in your head. The one that’s making you be irrationally concerned over a defined unobservable.
No amount of handwaving, being concerned, or liking your current ‘subjective reality’ is going to make your unobservable observable. Fix the core problem, don’t try to paper over it.
The standard worry about DT is that (from the outside) a coherent thread of consciousnes goes though a set of incoherent external world states, which, for, the inside, would look like observing chaos. You have said that what you are worried about is observing chaos, although you have also said that you have a solution to the no-physical-law problem of DT. So who knows?
ETA If you jump, but don’t notice you are jumping, what is the problem.
You’ve also said that what you are worried about is something to do,with measure, although there is an answer to that as well...so....whatever.
Which is?
I do not recall saying any such thing.
I really don’t know what the heck you are talking about. “No-physical-law” problem? And I thought I was bad at conveying these concepts.
The problem is that I prefer for my subjective consciousness to stay in one world.
An extrapolation from a single coherent theory, which you apparently think works through ‘observation.’
Observing chaos is the same thing as having no discernible physical laws.
Why?
I took your use of the word ‘worried’ to say that I was afraid this was true.
Because I subjectively value my universe and do not wish to go to another one.
Under MWI and DT, which are not the same theory, you dont go to another universe, in the sense of leaving the old one..
Under physicalism+simulationusmism, which is not the same as the other two, you can cease to exist at one point in time, and be resurrected in a simulation millions of years later. But I don’t see how staying awake would prevent that.
I note that Coherent falls some way short of True or even Likely.
Arguably, i would have no way of knowing whether or not I am in a supposition of identical mind states or world states, because they’re identical. Why would a difference that doesn’t make a difference, make a difference?
Or: what is the dirfference, if there is one?
If it’s rational to prefer your perceptions to conform to an external reality, than it’s rational to not want to be someone else every morning.
But is it rational to entertain theories about differences in external reality that could never make any difference to subjective or objective experience?
I value other minds existing to interact with me, even if I can’t perceive them directly. And I value waking up tomorrow in the same universe (more or less) that I’m in now.
Is this rational? Eliezer defines rationality as systematized winning; I’m pointing out what.
Under DT, and MWI, which are not the same, you wake up in all the universes you were ever in.
ETA
You might have a concern about your measure being dominated by simulations.That isnt the same as jumping. Also, you can only be simulated if you ever had a real life, so it’s possible to take the glass half full view, that the simulations are a bonus to a fully real life, not a dilution.