Basically, all that is required is for two minds in the same conscious state to have only one phenomenological experience. This is something I think is absolutely true.
Basically, all that is required is for two minds in the same conscious state to have only one phenomenological experience.
If you mean that there is literally one experience (numerical identity), not two identical experiences (qualitative identity),
that would need support.
And you still need further assumptions to say something interesting about measure, expected experience, personal history etc.
If there are two identical experiences, it doesn’t actually affect the argument. Except that you would be wholly in a simulation (or not), and there would be less incentive for future FAIs to simulate you. Grim, if I took it seriously.
If there are two identical experiences, there is no problem of jumping, .or waking up as someone else. Identical twins don’t randomly swap identities. Jumping is a dynamical, causal process. You can make it happen by transplanting a brain,or copying a neural pattern, but there is no reason it should happen because of pure logic,
While we’re on the subject, if there is a single experience threaded through multiple worlds, there is also no jumping. You can’t jump from one version your self another, because there is only one version. You can’t jump from one world to another, in the sense of leaving one and ariving at another, because you are always in all of them.
That disposes of jumping, but you seem to have some further concern about simulation.
If there are two identical experiences, there is no problem of jumping, .or waking up as someone else. Identical twins don’t randomly swap identities. Jumping is a dynamical, causal process. You can make it happen by transplanting a brain,or copying a neural pattern, but there is no reason it should happen because of pure logic,
Sure, but haven’t I just said I don’t take Duplication seriously?
While we’re on the subject, if there is a single experience threaded through multiple worlds, there is also no jumping. You can’t jump from one version your self another, because there is only one version.
The whole point is about what happens when my self becomes less detailed. If it resumes its former detail (waking up), all may not be as it was. If a memory is completely extracted from my brain, than my brain ceases to anchor me predominantly in worlds where that memory happened. Other options could fill in the hole.
You can’t jump from one world to another, in the sense of leaving one and ariving at another, because you are always in all of them.
This has never been about ‘jumping’ wholesale! I just used the word because there is no other.
Sure, but haven’t I just said I don’t take Duplication seriously?
“Unification (Bostrom’s term) seems to be almost irrefutable”
The whole point is about what happens when my self becomes less detailed.
I would have thought the point was justifying the claim about dissolution.
If it resumes its former detail (waking up), all may not be as it was
That is, somehow or other, a claim about causlaity, .transtemporal identity, or something else you have never provided a premise relating to.
If it resumes its former detail (waking up), all may not be as it was. If a memory is completely extracted from my brain, than my brain ceases to anchor me predominantly in worlds where that memory happened. Other options could fill in the hole.
I can make some sense of that, assuming duplication. If your brain has been copied N times, then you have a 1/N chance of being the original …. assuming you can only be one at time.
That would create a worry about being in a simulation that wasn’t stable, but your actual worry is apparently about lack of reality....although a .simulation still has an indirect connection to reality.
But then you believe in Unification, which would mean you you are indissolubly n whatever world you ate in.
This has never been about ‘jumping’ wholesale! I just used the word because there is no other.
Basically, all that is required is for two minds in the same conscious state to have only one phenomenological experience. This is something I think is absolutely true.
If you mean that there is literally one experience (numerical identity), not two identical experiences (qualitative identity), that would need support.
And you still need further assumptions to say something interesting about measure, expected experience, personal history etc.
If there are two identical experiences, it doesn’t actually affect the argument. Except that you would be wholly in a simulation (or not), and there would be less incentive for future FAIs to simulate you. Grim, if I took it seriously.
If there are two identical experiences, there is no problem of jumping, .or waking up as someone else. Identical twins don’t randomly swap identities. Jumping is a dynamical, causal process. You can make it happen by transplanting a brain,or copying a neural pattern, but there is no reason it should happen because of pure logic,
While we’re on the subject, if there is a single experience threaded through multiple worlds, there is also no jumping. You can’t jump from one version your self another, because there is only one version. You can’t jump from one world to another, in the sense of leaving one and ariving at another, because you are always in all of them.
That disposes of jumping, but you seem to have some further concern about simulation.
Sure, but haven’t I just said I don’t take Duplication seriously?
The whole point is about what happens when my self becomes less detailed. If it resumes its former detail (waking up), all may not be as it was. If a memory is completely extracted from my brain, than my brain ceases to anchor me predominantly in worlds where that memory happened. Other options could fill in the hole.
This has never been about ‘jumping’ wholesale! I just used the word because there is no other.
“Unification (Bostrom’s term) seems to be almost irrefutable”
I would have thought the point was justifying the claim about dissolution.
That is, somehow or other, a claim about causlaity, .transtemporal identity, or something else you have never provided a premise relating to.
I can make some sense of that, assuming duplication. If your brain has been copied N times, then you have a 1/N chance of being the original …. assuming you can only be one at time.
That would create a worry about being in a simulation that wasn’t stable, but your actual worry is apparently about lack of reality....although a .simulation still has an indirect connection to reality.
But then you believe in Unification, which would mean you you are indissolubly n whatever world you ate in.
You can use a phrase, or invent a word.