My understanding of Eli’s beef with the Born rule is this (he can correct me if I’m wrong): the Born rule appears to be a bridging rule in fundamental physics that directly tells us something about how qualia bind to the universe. This seems odd. Furthermore, if the binding of qualia to the universe is given by a separate fundamental bridging rule independent of the other laws of physics, then the zombie world really is logically possible, or in other words epiphenomenalism is true. (Just postulate a universe with all the laws of physics except Born’s bridging rule. Such a universe is, as far as we know, logically consistent.) Eli argues against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that if epiphenomenalism is true, then the correlation between beliefs (which are qualia) with our statements and actions (which are physical processes) is just a miraculous coincidence.
What follows are my own comments as opposed to a summary of what I believe Eli thinks:
Why can’t the correlation between physical states and beliefs arise by an arrow of causation that goes from the physical states to the beliefs? In this case epiphenomenalism would be true (since qualia have no effect on the physical world), but the correlation would not be a coincidence (since the physical world directly causes qualia). I think the objection to this is that if there really is a bridging law, then the coincidence remains that it is such a reasonable bridging law. That is, what we say we experience and physically act as though we experience actually matches (usually) what we do experience, as opposed to relating to what we do experience in some arbitrarily scrambled way. If qualia bind to some higher emergent level having to do with information processing, then it seems non-coincidental that the bridging law is reasonable. (Because the things it is mapping between seem to have a close and clear relationship.) However, the Born rule seems to suggest that the bridging rule is at the level of fundamental physics.
Maybe if we could derive the Born rule as a property of the information processing performed by a quantum universe the mystery would go away.
“Eli argues against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that if epiphenomenalism is true, then the correlation between beliefs (which are qualia) with our statements and actions (which are physical processes) is just a miraculous coincidence.”
Supposing he does, I must point out that it is false to say that beliefs are qualia. In fact, beliefs are part of the intentional stance. That is well worked out in Dennett’s book by the same name.
The intentional level can be accounted for in physical terms (See for instance “Kinds of Minds” by Dennett to see how intentionality unfolds from genes to amoebas to Karl Popper.
One could insist on being a phenomenal realist, and say that beliefs are both an intentional interpretation of a physical system that can be accounted for without the aid of qualia, and furthermore that there was another aspect of beliefs that is the experiential aspect, the qualia-ness of them.
Even holding such a position, one needs only to explain our beliefs as long as they are physically causally effective upon the world (for instance causing us to talk about qualia, beliefs, etc..).
So if there are beliefs as intentional descriptions of organisms, AND in addition beliefs as qualia, the second kind is UTTERLY unexplainable by its very nature.
There is no need to account for them, because we have no reason to believe they exist, since if they did, they would not figure in our theories, being causally inneficient.
Eddie,
My understanding of Eli’s beef with the Born rule is this (he can correct me if I’m wrong): the Born rule appears to be a bridging rule in fundamental physics that directly tells us something about how qualia bind to the universe. This seems odd. Furthermore, if the binding of qualia to the universe is given by a separate fundamental bridging rule independent of the other laws of physics, then the zombie world really is logically possible, or in other words epiphenomenalism is true. (Just postulate a universe with all the laws of physics except Born’s bridging rule. Such a universe is, as far as we know, logically consistent.) Eli argues against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that if epiphenomenalism is true, then the correlation between beliefs (which are qualia) with our statements and actions (which are physical processes) is just a miraculous coincidence.
What follows are my own comments as opposed to a summary of what I believe Eli thinks:
Why can’t the correlation between physical states and beliefs arise by an arrow of causation that goes from the physical states to the beliefs? In this case epiphenomenalism would be true (since qualia have no effect on the physical world), but the correlation would not be a coincidence (since the physical world directly causes qualia). I think the objection to this is that if there really is a bridging law, then the coincidence remains that it is such a reasonable bridging law. That is, what we say we experience and physically act as though we experience actually matches (usually) what we do experience, as opposed to relating to what we do experience in some arbitrarily scrambled way. If qualia bind to some higher emergent level having to do with information processing, then it seems non-coincidental that the bridging law is reasonable. (Because the things it is mapping between seem to have a close and clear relationship.) However, the Born rule seems to suggest that the bridging rule is at the level of fundamental physics.
Maybe if we could derive the Born rule as a property of the information processing performed by a quantum universe the mystery would go away.
“Eli argues against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that if epiphenomenalism is true, then the correlation between beliefs (which are qualia) with our statements and actions (which are physical processes) is just a miraculous coincidence.”
Supposing he does, I must point out that it is false to say that beliefs are qualia. In fact, beliefs are part of the intentional stance. That is well worked out in Dennett’s book by the same name.
The intentional level can be accounted for in physical terms (See for instance “Kinds of Minds” by Dennett to see how intentionality unfolds from genes to amoebas to Karl Popper.
One could insist on being a phenomenal realist, and say that beliefs are both an intentional interpretation of a physical system that can be accounted for without the aid of qualia, and furthermore that there was another aspect of beliefs that is the experiential aspect, the qualia-ness of them.
Even holding such a position, one needs only to explain our beliefs as long as they are physically causally effective upon the world (for instance causing us to talk about qualia, beliefs, etc..).
So if there are beliefs as intentional descriptions of organisms, AND in addition beliefs as qualia, the second kind is UTTERLY unexplainable by its very nature.
There is no need to account for them, because we have no reason to believe they exist, since if they did, they would not figure in our theories, being causally inneficient.