I wonder if Max Tegmark would have written a similar comment. I’m not sure if there is a meaningful difference regarding Luke’s question to say that there are only quantum amplitudes versus there are only relations.
What I’m saying is that in the physical world there are only causes and effects, and the primeness of a heap of pebbles is not an ontologically basic fact operating as a separate and additional element of physical reality, but it is nonetheless about as “intrinsic” to the heap of pebbles as anything.
Once morality stops being mysterious and you start cashing it out as a logical function, the moral awfulness of a murder is exactly as intrinsic as the primeness of a heap of pebbles. Just as we don’t care whether pebble heaps are prime or experience any affect associated with its primeness, the Pebblesorters don’t care or compute whether a murder is morally awful; and this doesn’t mean that a heap of five pebbles isn’t really prime or that primeness is arbitrary, nor yet that on the “moral Twin Earth” murder could be a good thing. And there are no little physical primons associated with the pebble-heap that could be replaced by compositons to make it composite without changing the number of pebbles; and no physical stone tablet on which morality is written that could be rechiseled to make murder good without changing the circumstances of the murder; but if you’re looking for those you’re looking in the wrong closet.
Are you arguing that the world is basically a cellular automaton and that therefore beauty is logically implied to be a property of some instance of the universe? If some agent does perceive beauty then that is a logically implied fact about the circumstances. Asking if another agent would perceive the same beauty could be rephrased as asking about the equality of the expressions of an equation?
I think a lot of people are arguing about the ambiguity of the string “beauty” as it is multiply realized.
I wonder if Max Tegmark would have written a similar comment. I’m not sure if there is a meaningful difference regarding Luke’s question to say that there are only quantum amplitudes versus there are only relations.
What I’m saying is that in the physical world there are only causes and effects, and the primeness of a heap of pebbles is not an ontologically basic fact operating as a separate and additional element of physical reality, but it is nonetheless about as “intrinsic” to the heap of pebbles as anything.
Once morality stops being mysterious and you start cashing it out as a logical function, the moral awfulness of a murder is exactly as intrinsic as the primeness of a heap of pebbles. Just as we don’t care whether pebble heaps are prime or experience any affect associated with its primeness, the Pebblesorters don’t care or compute whether a murder is morally awful; and this doesn’t mean that a heap of five pebbles isn’t really prime or that primeness is arbitrary, nor yet that on the “moral Twin Earth” murder could be a good thing. And there are no little physical primons associated with the pebble-heap that could be replaced by compositons to make it composite without changing the number of pebbles; and no physical stone tablet on which morality is written that could be rechiseled to make murder good without changing the circumstances of the murder; but if you’re looking for those you’re looking in the wrong closet.
Are you arguing that the world is basically a cellular automaton and that therefore beauty is logically implied to be a property of some instance of the universe? If some agent does perceive beauty then that is a logically implied fact about the circumstances. Asking if another agent would perceive the same beauty could be rephrased as asking about the equality of the expressions of an equation?
I think a lot of people are arguing about the ambiguity of the string “beauty” as it is multiply realized.