Accept as a foundational conclusion of the field, ’human values seem incredibly complicated and messy; they’re a giant evolved stew of competing preferences, attitudes, and feelings, not the kind of thing that can be captured in any short simple ruleset (though different rulesets can certainly perform better or worse as simplified idealizations).
I have not noticed mainstream ethicists assuming values are simple. “Ethics is value” is a rationalist belief , not a mainstream belief.
Binding exceptionless commitments matter to understanding this complicated thing; folk concepts like courage and honesty and generosity matter;
Ditto. Who ignores, or argues against courage and honesty?
Stop thinking of the project of ethics as ‘figure out which simple theory is True’.
I agree with that, it’s time to look at hybridised theories.
Start instead thinking of ethics as a project of trying to piece together psychological models of this insanely complicated and messy thing, ’human morality
I don’t agree with that. For one thing, that’s already a branch of psychology. For another, it’s purely descriptive , and so gives up on improving ethics.
Ethics should be grounded in an understanding of what humans use it for, but should not be limited to it.
Who ignores, or argues against courage and honesty?
As an intrinsic value? Lots of utilitarians, myself included. I’m unsure if Rob’s intent was to suggest these things are values worth respecting intrinsically or just instrumentally.
Who ignores, or argues against courage and honesty?
Lots of utilitarians, myself included.
But it was supposed to be a comment about mainstream philosophy. It’s not a given that mainstream ethicist will be some sort of utilitarian in the way that a rationalist probably will.
I don’t agree with that. For one thing, that’s already a branch of psychology. For another, it’s purely descriptive , and so gives up on improving ethics.
I agree with this. I don’t really mind if moral philosophy ends up merging into moral psychology, but I do think there’s a potentially valuable things philosophers can add here, that might not naturally occur to descriptive psychology as important: we can try to tease apart meta-values of varying strengths, and ask what we might value if we knew more, had more ability to self-modify, were wiser and more disciplined, etc.
Ethics is partly a scientific problem of figuring out what we currently value; but it’s also an engineering problem of figuring out and implementing what we should value, which will plausibly end up cashing out as something like ‘the equilibrium of our values under sufficient reflection and (reflectively endorsed!) self-modification’.
If you think ethics should be less narrow, why focus only on values? If you think that the only function of ethics is to maximise value, you will be led to the narrow conclusion that consequentialism is the only metaethics. But if you recognise that ethics also has he functions of shaping individual behaviour, enabling coordination, and avoiding conflict , then you can take a broad, multifaceted view of metaethics.
I have not noticed mainstream ethicists assuming values are simple. “Ethics is value” is a rationalist belief , not a mainstream belief.
Ditto. Who ignores, or argues against courage and honesty?
I agree with that, it’s time to look at hybridised theories.
I don’t agree with that. For one thing, that’s already a branch of psychology. For another, it’s purely descriptive , and so gives up on improving ethics.
Ethics should be grounded in an understanding of what humans use it for, but should not be limited to it.
As an intrinsic value? Lots of utilitarians, myself included. I’m unsure if Rob’s intent was to suggest these things are values worth respecting intrinsically or just instrumentally.
But it was supposed to be a comment about mainstream philosophy. It’s not a given that mainstream ethicist will be some sort of utilitarian in the way that a rationalist probably will.
I agree with this. I don’t really mind if moral philosophy ends up merging into moral psychology, but I do think there’s a potentially valuable things philosophers can add here, that might not naturally occur to descriptive psychology as important: we can try to tease apart meta-values of varying strengths, and ask what we might value if we knew more, had more ability to self-modify, were wiser and more disciplined, etc.
Ethics is partly a scientific problem of figuring out what we currently value; but it’s also an engineering problem of figuring out and implementing what we should value, which will plausibly end up cashing out as something like ‘the equilibrium of our values under sufficient reflection and (reflectively endorsed!) self-modification’.
Again, it has not been proven that ethics is just about value.
If you think ethics should be less narrow, why focus only on values? If you think that the only function of ethics is to maximise value, you will be led to the narrow conclusion that consequentialism is the only metaethics. But if you recognise that ethics also has he functions of shaping individual behaviour, enabling coordination, and avoiding conflict , then you can take a broad, multifaceted view of metaethics.