There are some forms of synesthesia where certain letters get colored as certain colors. If an “u” is supposed to be red producing that dataconstruct to give to the next layer doesn’t need to conform to outside world. “U”s are not inherently red but seeing letters in colors can make a brain perform more/easier in certain tasks.
Phenomenology is concerned with what kind of entities these representations that are passed around are. There it makes sense to say that in the synesthesia a lettr concept invokes the qualia of color.
I was forming a rather complex view where eachsubsystem has direct knowlegde about the interfaces it has but indirect knowledge on what goes in other systems. This makes it so that a given representation is direct infallible knowledge to some system and fallible knowledge to other systems (seeing a red dot doesn’t mean one has seen a red photon, just the fact that you need a bunch of like 10 or so photons for the signal to carry forward from the eye).
Even if most of the interesting stuff is indirect knowledge the top level always needs its interface to the nearby bit. For the system to do the subcalculation /experience that it is doing it needs to be based on solid signals. The part that sees words from letters might be at the mercy and error rate of the letter seeing part. That is the word part can function one way if “u” is seen and “f” is not seen and another way if “u” is unseen and “f” is not seen, but should it try to produce words without hints or help from the letter seeing part it can not be sensitive to the wider universe.
There are some forms of synesthesia where certain letters get colored as certain colors. If an “u” is supposed to be red producing that dataconstruct to give to the next layer doesn’t need to conform to outside world. “U”s are not inherently red but seeing letters in colors can make a brain perform more/easier in certain tasks.
Phenomenology is concerned with what kind of entities these representations that are passed around are. There it makes sense to say that in the synesthesia a lettr concept invokes the qualia of color.
I was forming a rather complex view where eachsubsystem has direct knowlegde about the interfaces it has but indirect knowledge on what goes in other systems. This makes it so that a given representation is direct infallible knowledge to some system and fallible knowledge to other systems (seeing a red dot doesn’t mean one has seen a red photon, just the fact that you need a bunch of like 10 or so photons for the signal to carry forward from the eye).
Even if most of the interesting stuff is indirect knowledge the top level always needs its interface to the nearby bit. For the system to do the subcalculation /experience that it is doing it needs to be based on solid signals. The part that sees words from letters might be at the mercy and error rate of the letter seeing part. That is the word part can function one way if “u” is seen and “f” is not seen and another way if “u” is unseen and “f” is not seen, but should it try to produce words without hints or help from the letter seeing part it can not be sensitive to the wider universe.