the field of epistemology to be much healthier if it spent less time developing theory, and more time applying theories and reporting back about how they perform in practice.
Only certain aspects of a theory can be tested that way.
You can objectively show that a theory succeeds or fails at making observations . It is is less clear whether an explanation succeeds in explaining, and less clear still whether a model succeeds in corresponding to the territory. The lack of a test for correspondence per se, ie. the lack of an independent “standpoint” from which the map and the territory can be compared, is the is the major problem in scientific epistemology. Its the main thing that keeps non-materialst ontology going.
The thing scientific realists care about is having an accurate model of reality, knowing what things are. If you want that, then instrumentalism is giving up something of value to you. So long as it s possible. If realistic reference is impossible , then theres no loss of value, but proving realistic reference is impossible isn’t easy either.
Only certain aspects of a theory can be tested that way.
You can objectively show that a theory succeeds or fails at making observations . It is is less clear whether an explanation succeeds in explaining, and less clear still whether a model succeeds in corresponding to the territory. The lack of a test for correspondence per se, ie. the lack of an independent “standpoint” from which the map and the territory can be compared, is the is the major problem in scientific epistemology. Its the main thing that keeps non-materialst ontology going.
The thing scientific realists care about is having an accurate model of reality, knowing what things are. If you want that, then instrumentalism is giving up something of value to you. So long as it s possible. If realistic reference is impossible , then theres no loss of value, but proving realistic reference is impossible isn’t easy either.