Good—though I’d want to clarify that there are some reductionists who think that there must be a reductive explanation for all natural phenomena, even if some will remain unknowable to us (for practical or theoretical reasons).
Other non-reductionists believe that the idea of giving a causal explanation of certain facts is actually confused—it’s not that there is no such explanation, it’s that the very idea of giving certain kinds of explanation means we don’t fully understand the propositions involved. E.g. if someone were to ask why certain mathematical facts are true, hoping for a causal explanation in terms of brain-facts or historical-evolutionary facts, we might wonder whether they understood what math is about.
Good—though I’d want to clarify that there are some reductionists who think that there must be a reductive explanation for all natural phenomena, even if some will remain unknowable to us (for practical or theoretical reasons).
Other non-reductionists believe that the idea of giving a causal explanation of certain facts is actually confused—it’s not that there is no such explanation, it’s that the very idea of giving certain kinds of explanation means we don’t fully understand the propositions involved. E.g. if someone were to ask why certain mathematical facts are true, hoping for a causal explanation in terms of brain-facts or historical-evolutionary facts, we might wonder whether they understood what math is about.