We also agree that it’s not okay to reject a three-year-old illegitimate child — you, because you’d be “attached” to them; and me, because we’ve formed a personal bond that makes the child emotionally dependent on me.
I’m pretty sure I’d have no problem rejecting such a child, at least in the specific situation where I was misled into thinking it was mine. This discussion started by talking about a couple who had agreed to be monogamous, and where the wife had cheated on the husband and gotten pregnant by another man. You don’t seem to be considering the effect of the deceit and lies perpetuated by the mother in this scenario. It’s very different than, say, adoption, or genetic engineering, or if the couple had agreed to have a non-monogamous relationship.
I suspect most of the rejection and negative feelings toward the illegitimate child wouldn’t be because of genetics, but because of the deception involved.
Ah, interesting. The negative feelings you would get from the mother’s deception would lead you to reject the child. This would diminish the child’s welfare more than it would increase your own (by my judgment); but perhaps that does not bother you because you would feel justified in regarding the child as being morally distant from you, as distant as a stranger’s child, and so the child’s welfare would not be as important to you as your own. Please correct me if I’m wrong.
I, on the other hand, would still regard the child as being morally close to me, and would value their welfare more than my own, and so I would consider the act of abandoning them to be morally wrong. Continuing to care for the child would be easy for me because I would still have filial love for child. See, the mother’s deceit has no effect on the moral question (in my moral-consequentialist framework) and it has no effect on my filial love (which is independent of the mother’s fidelity).
you would feel justified in regarding the child as being morally distant from you, as distant as a stranger’s child, and so the child’s welfare would not be as important to you as your own. Please correct me if I’m wrong.
That’s right. Also, regarding the child as my own would encourage other people to lie about paternity, which would ultimately reduce welfare by a great deal more. Compare the policy of not negotiating with terrorists: if negotiating frees hostages, but creates more incentives for taking hostages later, it may reduce welfare to negotiate, even if you save the lives of the hostages by doing so.
See, the mother’s deceit has no effect on the moral question (in my moral-consequentialist framework) and it has no effect on my filial love (which is independent of the mother’s fidelity).
Precommitting to this sets you up to be deceived, whereas precommitting to the other position makes it less likely that you’ll be deceived.
This is mostly relevant for fathers who are still emotionally attached to the child.
If a man detaches when he finds that a child isn’t his descendant, then access is a burden, not a benefit.
One more possibility: A man hears that a child isn’t his, detaches—and then it turns out that there was an error at the DNA lab, and the child is his. How retrievable is the relationship?
… I’m sorry, that’s an important issue, but it’s tangential. What do you want me to say? The state’s current policy is an inconsistent hodge-podge of common law that doesn’t fairly address the rights and needs of families and individuals. There’s no way to translate “Ideally, a father ought to love their child this much” into “The court rules that Mr. So-And-So will pay Ms. So-And-So this much every year”.
So how would you translate your belief that paternity is irrelevant into a social or legal policy, then? I don’t see how you can argue paternity is irrelevant, and then say that cases where men have to pay support for other people’s children are tangential.
I’m pretty sure I’d have no problem rejecting such a child, at least in the specific situation where I was misled into thinking it was mine. This discussion started by talking about a couple who had agreed to be monogamous, and where the wife had cheated on the husband and gotten pregnant by another man. You don’t seem to be considering the effect of the deceit and lies perpetuated by the mother in this scenario. It’s very different than, say, adoption, or genetic engineering, or if the couple had agreed to have a non-monogamous relationship.
I suspect most of the rejection and negative feelings toward the illegitimate child wouldn’t be because of genetics, but because of the deception involved.
Ah, interesting. The negative feelings you would get from the mother’s deception would lead you to reject the child. This would diminish the child’s welfare more than it would increase your own (by my judgment); but perhaps that does not bother you because you would feel justified in regarding the child as being morally distant from you, as distant as a stranger’s child, and so the child’s welfare would not be as important to you as your own. Please correct me if I’m wrong.
I, on the other hand, would still regard the child as being morally close to me, and would value their welfare more than my own, and so I would consider the act of abandoning them to be morally wrong. Continuing to care for the child would be easy for me because I would still have filial love for child. See, the mother’s deceit has no effect on the moral question (in my moral-consequentialist framework) and it has no effect on my filial love (which is independent of the mother’s fidelity).
That’s right. Also, regarding the child as my own would encourage other people to lie about paternity, which would ultimately reduce welfare by a great deal more. Compare the policy of not negotiating with terrorists: if negotiating frees hostages, but creates more incentives for taking hostages later, it may reduce welfare to negotiate, even if you save the lives of the hostages by doing so.
Precommitting to this sets you up to be deceived, whereas precommitting to the other position makes it less likely that you’ll be deceived.
If the mother married the biological father and restricted your access to the child but still required you to pay child support how would you feel?
This is mostly relevant for fathers who are still emotionally attached to the child.
If a man detaches when he finds that a child isn’t his descendant, then access is a burden, not a benefit.
One more possibility: A man hears that a child isn’t his, detaches—and then it turns out that there was an error at the DNA lab, and the child is his. How retrievable is the relationship?
… I’m sorry, that’s an important issue, but it’s tangential. What do you want me to say? The state’s current policy is an inconsistent hodge-podge of common law that doesn’t fairly address the rights and needs of families and individuals. There’s no way to translate “Ideally, a father ought to love their child this much” into “The court rules that Mr. So-And-So will pay Ms. So-And-So this much every year”.
So how would you translate your belief that paternity is irrelevant into a social or legal policy, then? I don’t see how you can argue paternity is irrelevant, and then say that cases where men have to pay support for other people’s children are tangential.