EY seems to be taken with the resemblance between a causal diagram and the abstract structure of axioms, inferences and theorems in mathematcal logic. But there are differences: with causality, our evidence is the latest causal output, the leaf nodes. We have to trace back to the Big Bang from them.However, in maths we start from axioms, and cannot get directly to the theorems or leaf nodes. We could see this process as exploring a pre-existing territory, but it is hard to see what this adds, since the axioms and rules of inference are sufficient for truth, and it is hard to see, in EY’s presentation how literally he takes the idea.
We could see this process as exploring a pre-existing territory, but it is hard to see what this adds, since the axioms and rules of inference are sufficient for truth, and it is hard to see, in EY’s presentation how literally he takes the idea.
It’s useful for reasoning heuristically about conjectures.
EY seems to be taken with the resemblance between a causal diagram and the abstract structure of axioms, inferences and theorems in mathematcal logic. But there are differences: with causality, our evidence is the latest causal output, the leaf nodes. We have to trace back to the Big Bang from them.However, in maths we start from axioms, and cannot get directly to the theorems or leaf nodes. We could see this process as exploring a pre-existing territory, but it is hard to see what this adds, since the axioms and rules of inference are sufficient for truth, and it is hard to see, in EY’s presentation how literally he takes the idea.
Er, no, causal models and logical implications seem to me very different in how they propagate modularly. Unifying the two is going to be troublesome.
It’s useful for reasoning heuristically about conjectures.
Could I have an example?